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Abstract
We in the United States face an awesome challenge: NASA's role well into the
next millennium must be decided now. The project goals to be achieved over the
next quarter century need to be set in order now. Our scarce financial resources
need to be allocated now to those projects that will maximize our long-term
productivity.
NASA's course must be worthy, its execution impeccable, and its understanding
of (and tolerance for) risk tailored to the unique developmental requirements of
each situation.
• Defining a worthy vision for the NASA organization
The first section of this paper discusses notions of greatness that have guided
NASA in the past, presents values that might be delivered by NASA in the
future, and examines the skills required for NASA to execute a vision of
greatness.
• Scoping a strategically significant mission agenda
The second section reviews three possible patterns of space development by
NASA: (1) a mission to protect the ecology of the Earth, (2) the engineering of
the technologies critical to space transportation and a healthy, productive life in
space, and (3) the management of a major nonterrestrial resource project.
• Sourcing--and sustaining--optimum financing
The paper's third section discusses potential sources of funds, opportunities for
sustainable collaboration, and the life cycle of NASA's funding responsibility for
its space development program.
Alternatives are abundant, The key to success, however, is our willingness as a
nation to commit to a shared notion of greatness. Only steeled by such a
commitment can we hope to make the wealth-creating technological advances
and significant scientific discoveries to sustain our leadership into the
21st century.
A lot has happened since the 1984
NASA summer study, and even
since the 1989 declaration by
President Bush--on the occasion
of the 20th anniversary of the
landing on the Moon--that the U.S.
space program will be redirected
toward sustained exploration of
space. Who would have imagined
that in this short time peace would
break out all over: that urgent
Iongings for democracy would
thrust China into a massive internal
rebellion; that the yearnings of
Eastern Europeans would thrash
the Berlin Wall to dust; that in the
space of a few weeks skeptical
Romanian and Czechoslovakian
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people would shake off their
totalitarian systems in completely
decent and peaceful ways. The
surprising occurrence of these
monumental events fills one with
awe and wonder at the changes
that lie ahead as we near the
end of a millennium. One can
only imagine the truths we have
yet to discover, the many realities
yet to unfold.
Full of hopes, dreams, visions of
where these blossomings may
lead us as a global community, we
are at the same time crushed by
alarming realities at home-
weighed down by our massive
budget deficit, surprised at the
growing political irrelevance
and eroding commercial
competitiveness of the United
States in the world, and shattered
and saddened by the problems
plaguing the former hallmark of
our technological prowess, the
National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, in the aftershock
from the Space Shuttle Challenger
disaster--the January 1986
explosion that thrust the
organization into a massive
reevaluation. And now an agenda
is under consideration that is so
broad, so costly, and so far
beyond the scope of human
experience to date that the risks
are extraordinary. It is only with
courage and humility that cost
estimates of these yet uncharted
courses can even be attempted,
as the potential for unpredicted
events is enormous.
In November 1989, NASA laid out
five approaches to going to the
Moon and Mars using techniques
and technologies the agency had
studied for years and sometimes
decades. Implementation would
take more than a quarter of a
century at a cost of $400 billion.
That is regarded by the current
Administration as simply too long
and too much (Hilts 1990b).
Eager to arrive at a realizable
agenda, the Bush Administration
has commissioned exhaustive
brainstorming to refocus and
redirect the U.S. space program,
under the guidance of the National
Space Council and its head, Vice
President Dan Quayle. How can
the "Bush vision" be molded into
a challenging, yet realizable,
program supported by adequate,
consistent funding? How can
NASA best prepare itself to bring
the Bush Administration's
redirection to fruition? This
paper assesses NASA from
organizational, strategic, and
financial perspectives to determine
if it is well positioned to meet the
challenges of space exploration
and development on into the next
millennium:
• Defining a worthy vision for
the NASA organization
• Scoping a strategically
significant mission agenda
• Sourcing-and sustaining--
optimum financing
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Section 1:
Defining a Worthy Vision
Leaders, through their visionary
grasp of the possible, energize
their followers and marshal them
toward fulfillment of the goal. A
vision is an energizing view of
the future role or function of an
organization, including its distinctive
values, skills, and operating style.
As a coherent directive, a vision
statement provides focus: it
provides a context for evaluating
the appropriateness of potential
missions and objectives; it
suggests criteria for distinctive
performance; and it empowers
decision-makers throughout the
organization to raise issues, assess
options, and make choices. Always
articulating the value to be
delivered to those having a stake
in an organization, the vision
statement further provides a
standard against which to evaluate
external competitive positioning of
the organization over the long term.
The Bush Administration perceives
that there is a crisis of vision.
Vice President Dan Quayle has
commented that "Despite our
continued scientific and
technological preeminence, our
Government has not done as well
as it could have in marshaling the
resources and the leadership
necessary to keep us ahead in
space. Our competitive advantage
in technology has disappeared"
(Hilts 1990b). Such a perceived
crisis of direction cannot be
tolerated for long, because NASA,
our spearhead of technological
innovation, has a responsibility of
critical strategic significance to our
nation. To ensure that NASA is
on a worthy course, a vision of
NASA's future greatness must be
clearly defined, the value to be
delivered by NASA must be fully
understood, and the skills and style
required to execute the vision must
be specifically identified.
Notions of Greatness
The directive to explore and
develop space is a boundless
undertaking that is not likely to
reach fruition in our lifetime (unless,
of course, our technological
breakthroughs advance at an
exponential rate, or unless we have
the good fortune to come to know
other intelligence in the universe
that has already figured everything
out).
In contrast, the U.S. space program
appears to have undergone
short-term eras of leadership,
demarcated by changes in
President. The U.S. space
program, framed by the President's
vision perhaps more than any
other program because of its
discretionary financing, is
often planned in terms of
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accomplishments realizable during
that President's term in office. The
implemented program is the result
of an iterative process: The vision
set by the President is constrained
by the financial resources allocated
by Congress, delimited by the
technological capabilities held in
hand by NASA (and other U.S.
academic, commercial, and
engineering institutions), and
dependent on the willingness of the
American people to sustain support
over the project lifetime. There is
an expense involved in this iterative
process: Each change of vision
creates new issues, alters priorities,
and redefines standards. It is far
more cost-effective to develop a
strategy for human exploration of
the solar system that can endure
for at least 20 years, longer than
the term of any one President,
most members of Congress, or the
average NASA manager (Aaron et
al. 1989).
NASA has had at least three
distinct directives since its
inception in the 1960s, not counting
the redirection under way since the
Bush Administration took office
(see table 1). A brief review of
these "strategic eras"
demonstrates the impact of
Presidential vision on the
organization up to now and
suggests parameters for the most
effective vision statement for the
1990s and beyond.
The Kennedy Vision: Establish U.S.
technological supremacy in the
world.
President John F. Kennedy
launched the space program with
a bold vision and a determined
foresight that have not been
enjoyed since. Envisioning the
U.S. space program as the
establisher of U.S. technological
supremacy in the world, he chose
as the focused mission objective a
race to place a man on the Moon
and return him safely to the Earth
before the end of the decade. The
entire program was a masterful
demonstration of management
efficiency and control, as the
mission, relying on hundreds of
thousands of subcontractors, was
completed on time and on budget.
The Apollo Program achieved the
desired technology goals, as it
reawakened interest in science and
engineering, enhanced international
competitiveness, preserved high-
technology industrial skills, and
marshaled major advances in
computers and micro-miniaturization
(Sawyer 1989). The program was
awe-inspiring, enjoyed enormous
funding support, and established a
reputation for NASA that was to
endure until it blew up with the
Space Shuttle Challenger in
January 1986.
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TABLE 1. The U.S. Manned Space Program, 1960-2000:
Strategic Eras and Program Effectiveness
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s
Characteristics Kennedy Nixon Reagan Bush
Initiative Compromise Commercialization Redirection
Vision Establish Provide Foster a Establish
U.S. economical private-sector U.S. as
technological access to space industry preeminent
supremacy space for spacefaring
military & nation
commercial
purposes
Mission Place a man Create a Build a Establish a
on the Moon reusable space station permanent
& return him transport to develop entity in
safely to the vehicle: commercial space; begin
Earth capture products sustained
75% of manned
commercial exploration
payloads of solar
worldwide system
Budget $ billion/yr $ billion/yr $ billion/yr $ billion/yr
3.25 3.0 7.5 13 est.
(26/8) as of '74 (400/30)
Performance On time, Late, Late, Taking a
on budget over budget over budget, fresh new
(one-time (missed redefined several look
event) economic times,
objective) uncertain
NASA Masterful Ineffective Confused Potential
management resurgence
NASA bargaining Strong: Moderate: Weak: Potential
leverage generous constant constant improvement
support & renegotiation budget-
funding to increase cutting &
funding rescoping
Public esteem High, Neutral Seriously Potential
inspired eroded renaissance
Sources: Banks 1988, Chandler 1989, Chandler and Mashek 1989, Sawyer 1989, Steacy 1989
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The Nixon Vision: Provide
economical access to space for
military and commercial purposes.
President Richard M. Nixon chose
a very specific vision which, if
successful, would have provided
important commercial benefits to
the United States and, if realized
during his term of office, would
have been a credit to his
administration. He envisioned
NASA as providing economical
access to space for military as well
as commercial purposes. The
mission, which was specifically
articulated, was to create a
reusable transport vehicle that
could capture 75 percent of the
commercial payloads worldwide.
While a reusable Space Shuttle has
been developed and put into
operation, it has never achieved the
economic objectives which were an
essential component of the vision.
The Shuttle will simply never be
able to provide the cheap, versatile,
and reliable access to space it
was supposed to, because it is a
complex and sophisticated
vehicle--a Ferrari, not a truck
(Budiansky 1987-88). Nevertheless,
the National Academy of Sciences
has noted that the Space Shuttle
engine was the only significant
development in space propulsion
technology in the past 20 years.
Lift.Off of STS.I, April 12, 1981
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The Reagan Vision: Foster a
private-sector space industry.
The directive to establish a
permanently manned space station
was a subsidiary mission in the
Reagan era, subordinate to his
vision of a Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI). However, to be
worth $30 billion, the space
station should really serve some
worthwhile national purpose.
Commercial applications have
obviously been grossly overstated,
As companies have backed off
space manufacturing since
solutions have already been
developed on Earth. Furthermore,
such a mission had been rejected
in favor of the lunar mission by
President Kennedy in 1961, a
space station not being considered
bold enough for the 1960s (Del
Guidice 1989) (although Skylab
was built, flown, and manned three
times in the 1970s).
Concept of Space Station Freedom
Artist." AI Chinchar
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The Bush Vision: Estabfish the
United States as the preeminent
spacefaring nation.
President George H. W. Bush's
tentative vision for the U.S. space
program is of "spacefarer,"
suggesting a navigator, one who
sets or charts a course. His
priority missions are to establish a
permanent entity in space and
begin sustained manned exploration
of the solar system. At this writing,
the mission agenda of the Bush
Administration has not been
finalized. Vice President Quayle
has requested that the NASA
Administrator, Richard H. Truly,
ensure that our space exploration
program is benefiting from a broad
range of ideas about different
architectures, new system concepts,
and promising technologies, as well
as opportunities to cut costs through
expanding international cooperation.
He asked Truly to query the best
and most innovative minds in the
country--in universities, at Federal
research centers, within our
aerospace industry, and elsewhere.
NASA will take the lead in the
search and will be responsible for
evaluating ideas (Broad 1990a).
Concept of a Lunar Base, Featuring the
Radiator of Its Nuclear Power Plant
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Alternate: The Have/Vision:
Uncover the secrets of the
universe.
In a 1990 interview,* Vaclav Havel,
President of the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic, stated that we
still have a long way to go in our
development, as we still have not
yet "uncovered the secrets of the
universe." It is interesting to select
such an idea as an alternate vision,
as a "control" to assess whether
President Bush's notion of
greatness goes far enough and is
sustainable over the long term.
Effectively, the difference between
"spacefaring" and "secret
uncovering" is that between the
means and the end, the journey
and the arrival.
Vaclav Havel, a former political
prisoner and a playwright, has
demonstrated a clarity and a
profundity in his political statements
at Czechoslovakia's helm that
are truly visionary and thought-
provoking. On the occasion of his
visit to the U.S. Congress in
February 1990, he articulated the
pace of change: "The human face
of the world is changing so rapidly
that none of the familiar political
speedometers are adequate. We
playwrights, who have to cram a
whole human life or an entire
historical era into a two-hour play,
can scarcely understand this
rapidity ourselves." And he
articulated his vision of the role of
intellectuals in shaping the new
Europe--which can be compared
to the role of space technology
and science in clearing the path
for the space age: "The salvation
of this human world lies nowhere
else than in the human heart, in
the human power to reflect, in
human meekness, and in human
responsibility. The only genuine
backbone of our actions--if they
are to be moral--is responsibility.
Responsibility to something higher
than my family, my country, my
firm, my success" (quoted by
Friedman 1990).
Recognizing that everything we
know of any importance about the
universe we've found out in the
last 50 years or so (Wilford 1990a),
it would not be unrealistic to expect
great truths to be unfolded in the
50 years to come. Numerous
projects on NASA's drawing boards
today promise to unlock important
secrets in the near future. For
example, it is hard to imagine a
more exciting secret than whether
or not there is other intelligent life
in the universe. The Search for
Extraterrestrial Intelligence (SETI),
a proposed $100 million, 10-year
project, funded by NASA but
operated by an independent
nonprofit group, plans to build a
highly advanced radio receiver that
will simultaneously scan 14 million
channels of radio waves from
*With Barbara Waiters on the ABC television program 20/20.
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Figure 3
Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs
and Opinions About NASA's Value
A leader of the humanistic psychology
movement, Abraham Maslow was
concerned primarily with the fullest
development of human potential; thus, his
burning interest was the study of superior
people. His theory of human personali_/
has become probably the most influential
conceptual basis for employee motivation
to be found in modern industry. The
needs occur in the order in which they
are presented, physiological first. Until
one level of need is fairly well satisfied,
the next higher need does not even
emerge. Once a particular set of needs
is fulfilled, it no longer motivates.
Source: Rush 1976.
existing radio telescopes around
the world. The National Academy
of Sciences has stated that it is
hard to imagine a discovery that
would have greater impact on
human perceptions than the
detection of extraterrestrial
intelligence (Broad 1990b).
Expected Values
The vision statement conveys
standards of excellence: "Be a
technology leader." "Provide
transportation economically."
"Be an explorer, a navigator, a
spacefarer." It determines which
values are given precedence, thus
providing a standard by which to
determine relative degrees of
excellence, usefulness, or worth
of tasks performed within the
organization. Each value to be
delivered targets a potential
competitive advantage or some
economic leverage to be derived
from realization of the vision.
The purpose of a commercial
organization is to create wealth
for its shareholders. As a
Government-sponsored institution,
NASA has a value to its
shareholders--the U.S. taxpayers--
that is much broader and more
complex.
A review of the literature reveals a
broad range of opinions held by the
public regarding what NASA's value
is. Probably the lively debate over
the efficacy of the space program
exists precisely because of this
wide disagreement. The composite
list of "values" that NASA "should"
be delivering, which follows, seems
remarkably similar to Maslow's
hierarchy of needs (fig. 3), from the
most basic physiological need for
survival (deriving economic "bread"
from commercial activities), through
safety, social, and esteem needs,
and finally to the peak experience
of creativity and self-actualization.
Maslow's theory postulates that the
most basic needs must be satisfied
before higher needs can be
addressed.
Maslow's A Opinions About A
oH_el_:r:dh: / \ NASA's Value /_ \
/Esteemneeds_ / techn_og::;', _:detship_
/ Belonging andloveneeds _ / UncovU:llflt:_::hthe
/_ Satety needs _ / D::::::_ m::::: e
/ Physiological needs k / products/services k
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Develop products and services
with clear economic advantages.
Many look to NASA as a
wellspring of new product and
service innovations that are
expected to keep the U.S.
economy competitive in the world.
This economic focus expects a
perfectly managed program (on
the order of the Apollo days) with
only outstanding economic results.
Any news about the difficulties of
engineering the highly complex
technologies of today is not
welcome. NASA is given causal
responsibility for ensuring U.S.
competitiveness in the world:
"Space leadership and
technological leadership are tied
together. Just as technological
leadership and American
competitiveness are tied together"
(Anderson 1988). Furthermore,
NASA is expected to fuel as well
as fully interact with the private
sector in their joint development
and spinoff efforts. "In the
vastness of technology, mutual
dependence between government
and the private sector nourishes
both"--Thomas G. Pownall,
Chairman, Martin Marietta
(Rappleye 1986).
Uncover facts through the
scientific method.
Others see NASA as a herald of
science: both putting scientific
knowledge to work in the
engineering feats of space
exploration and adding to our
scientific understanding of the
solar system. This view suggests
an approach to space exploration
that minimizes threats of loss of
life or health, a highly disciplined
approach grounded in the scientific
method. Indeed, with the exception
of the race to put the first man on
the Moon, NASA has approached
solar system exploration in a step-
by-step fashion. And remarkable
engineering and scientific
accomplishments have been made
by NASA's missions to the Moon
(Ranger, Surveyor, Apollo) and to
the planets (Mariner, Pioneer,
Viking, Voyager). Scientist
astronaut Sally Ride thinks NASA
should continue in this tradition.
She has stated that NASA should
avoid a spectacular "race to Mars"
and establish a lunar outpost as
part of a measured exploration of
the solar system. "We should
adopt a strategy to continue an
orderly expansion outward from the
Earth... a strategy of evolution
and natural progression" (quoted
by Broad 1989). Other space
experts would like NASA's scientific
focus to be inward toward the
Earth. "We'd better pursue the
things that work in space, like
surveying the Earth's resources,
weather patterns, climatic change--
things of direct and daily human
importance" (Brown 1989).
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Upfift mankind.
There are more emotionally
motivated constituents who value
NASA not for what it does
scientifically but for the social,
cultural, or political impact it has
on our collective consciousness,
whether national or global. The
success of the space program as
"a cultural evolution may open
many new options, including
opportunities to ease global
tensions, help the developing
world, and create a new culture
off our planet" (Lawler 1985). "The
U.S. will again lead the world in
developing space for the benefit of
its citizens and future generations
throughout the world" (Rockwell
1986). "Going to Mars is an
international endeavor. Political
benefits can be derived immediately--
not 30 years from now but every
year, through a joint project with
other countries, and the Soviet
Union in particular" (Del Guidice
1989). Perhaps the most shining
example of this ability of the space
program to uplift and unite is the
phenomenon of more than
600 million people who gathered
at their local television sets around
the world in July 1969 to witness
the U.S. landing on the Moon
241 500 miles away.
Establish and sustain U.S.
technological leadership.
Others view NASA as the
determinant of our technological
leadership in the world and
therefore a source of esteem. "It
is humanity's destiny to strive,
to seek, to find.., it is America's
destiny to lead" (Rosenthal 1989).
Essentially, "we must either
reaffirm U.S. preeminence in space
or permit other nations to catch
up or surpass us at the crucial
juncture" (Gorton 1986). Under
this value system, leadership can
be dangerously misconstrued to
mean "pay for everything." True
opportunities for differentiated,
competitive leadership need to be
understood and aggressively
pursued; however, the basis of
world esteem for our space
program should be authentic
technological achievement and
not simply financial daring.
Provide a religious or peak
experience.
Finally, there is a profoundly
fulfilling dimension to truly
marvelous achievements and truly
humbling failures. "There is
something almost religious about
man in space. The human
exploration of the solar system
appears quasi-religious, while
automated exploration is 'pure
science'" (Brown 1989).
Space exploration has a profound
moral dimension that cannot be
transgressed. The natural law,
when followed, leads on to
fulfillment of the mission but, when
violated, leads to difficulties and
even death. In these days of
avarice and deception that seem to
escape the heavy hand of justice,
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thejoysandsorrowsof space
explorationaretiedto a morality
thatdoesnotplayfavorites.
ComparetheinfamousWallStreet
"junkbond"crisisor thesavings
andloandebacle,engineeredby
thosewhomadetheirownrules
andusedthesystemforpersonal
gain,violatingallstandardsof fair
play,to spaceexplorers,whoare
obligedto uncover"the" ruleand
advancestrictlywithinits limits.
In spiteof thewonderfulheroism
of thesevenastronautswhorode
theChallenger to its demise, the
violation of the temperature limits
of the "O" rings led to immediate
ruin. It is the very discovery of the
rule--how things work--that
makes the quantum leap possible.
Effective communication of this
"truth" and "honor" of technological
and scientific exploration is sure to
shift prestige away from Wall Street
and draw career candidates into
engineering and science.
Space exploration will entail
extraordinary adventure and
discovery, but also enormous risk
and personal sacrifice• The deep
personal commitment that will be
required to depart on the long
journey replicates the religious
motif of death and resurrection:
I shall stretch out my hand
unhesitatingly towards the fiery
bread .... To take it is
•.. to surrender myself to
forces which will tear me away
painfully from myself in order to
drive me into danger, into
laborious undertakings, into a
constant renewal of ideas, into
an austere detachment•
(de Chardin 1972, p. 23)
One might wonder how a
Government-sponsored research
agency could possibly fulfill this
broad range of expectations. In fact,
excellent performance of the task
which NASA does best--advancing
technology and science-will provide
both practical and ennobling results•
•.. if some observer were to
come to us from one of the
stars what would he chiefly
notice?
Without question, two major
phenomena:
the first, that in the course of
half a century, technology has
advanced with incredible
rapidity, an advance not just of
scattered, localized technical
developments but of a real
geotechnology which spreads
out the close-woven network of
its interdependent enterprises
over the totality of the earth;
the second, that in the same
period, at the same pace and
on the same scale of planetary
cooperation and achievement
science has transformed in
every direction--from the
infinitesimal to the immense
and to the immensely
complex--our common vision
of the world and our common
power of action. (de Chardin
1972, p. 119)
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It is thealmostinstantaneous
globalizationof technological
innovationsandthetransformative
impactonqualityof lifeof scientific
breakthroughsthatcontributes,
daybyday,to theemergenceof a
visionofonecitizenry,oneplanet.
Ifthissetof expectedvaluesis
heldup totheBushandHavel
visions,weseethattheBush
visionmayinfluencetechnology
developmentandrequirethe
advancementof scienceto steer
thecourse;theBushjourneymay
establishour leadershiposition--
if wearethefirstto makeit;the
journeymayrequirecourageand
thusbe inspiring.ButBush's
visiondoesnothavetheclosure
thatHavel'svisionhas. Ifwemake
thejourneyinorderto uncoverthe
secretsof theuniverseandif we
succeedin realizingthatvision,
it is certainthatapeakexperience
filledwithaweandwonderwillbe
anintegralpartof "truth's"
unfolding.
Elements of Excellent Execution
A worthy vision, excellently
executed, reaps outstanding
results. Skills form the bridge
between strategy and execution.
The expected values determine the
kind of skills needed. American
taxpayers look to their national
space exploration and development
program for highlycomPetitive new
products and services, scientific
facts, an uplifting perspective,
preeminent technological
leadership, and ethical and moral
fortitude.
Excellence, grace, skill in execution
conveys an organization's essence
or style. But NASA does many
things. NASA is not a single
business unit, but a broad, rich
organization with activities under
way on many levels. What does
NASA do? NASA is a problem-
solver, trying to diagnose the
startling environmental symptoms
occurring on Planet Earth;
NASA is an innovative engineer
of technological advances;
NASA is a conceiver, designer,
implementer of "big science"
experiments and exploration
projects; NASA is the developer
of the Space Shuttle and Space
Station Freedom and would like to
be the developer of colonies on
the Moon and Mars; and NASA is
the operator of the Space Shuttle,
although operations are clearly
not within its charter. Each set
of functional tasks requires a
different set of skills and styles of
management as well as distinctive
guidelines and criteria for measuring
results and assessing whether
they are appropriately aligned with
the overall vision. It is the vision,
however, that pulls all of these
incongruous tasks together and
weaves their diverse contributions
into a single recognizable
achievement.
However, the vision must be decided
upon: Which vision, "spacefarer" or
"secret uncoverer," best focuses
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theNASAorganizationonworthy
accomplishments over the next
20 to 30 years? My purpose here
is not to promote one visionary
concept over another but rather to
demonstrate the role and function
of a vision in coloring the entire
decision-making process within
an organization.
The Skilled Professional
Excellent performance of NASA's
multitude of tasks requires a rich
array of the very best skills
available in America today.
Nothing less than the very best
minds should be brought to bear
on this major potential to revitalize
our nation. The critical skills
essential to executing NASA's
numerous tasks include
• Visionary leadership
• Technical competence
• Entrepreneurial judgment
• Problem-solving ability
• Project management expertise
• The ability to innovate/
experiment/create
• Navigational skills
The notion of vision ranks these
critical skills and determines who will
implement the vision. If we want
to be the preeminent spacefarers,
then perhaps navigational skills
and entrepreneurial judgment
will be the critical skills required
by the organization. However, if
the pursuit is of truths about the
universe, then perhaps the ability
to solve problems and the ability to
innovate, experiment, create will be
the most critical skills required.
The skilled professional may be
homegrown or hired with the
appropriate experience or
contracted to fill a short-term
need. But we will apply different
evaluation criteria in searching for
a "spacefarer" than in searching
for a "secret uncoverer." To
realize the "spacefarer" vision, we
would look for the characteristics of
an explorer, an adventurer, a risk-
taker. To accomplish the "secret
uncoverer" vision, we would need
a more rigorous expertise based
on proven results in innovating,
discovering, inventing. The first
suggests a fortitude in facing the
unknown. The second suggests
facing the unknown, wrestling the
unknown to the ground, and rising
victorious with insight into its parts
and how the parts relate to each
other to create the whole. The
criteria for selection become
more rigorous; the measures of
successful performance, more
precise.
The only way to reduce the
timeframe and cost of research and
experimentation and maximize
effectiveness is to bring the best
minds to bear on critical problems.
Even if a premium must be paid
over industry rates to attract such
talent, the resulting maximization
of NASA's output with respect
to its vision would more than
compensate for the increased
investment in human capital.
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Tobeableto respondagilelyto
problemsandprojectsasthey
arise,NASAshouldbeexempt
fromcertainCivilService
regulationsandbegivenflexibility
inpersonnelhiring,advancement,
retirement,andtheassembling
anddisbandingofteams,aswell
astheresourcesto rewardtruly
significant,ground-breaking,
wealth-creatingcontributions.
The Pivotal Job
The pivotal jobs are those that
are critical to demonstrating the
vision. Those holding such jobs
are effectively the delegated vision
actualizers who, given sufficient
leeway, exercise their judgment,
intuition, and responsibility in
service of the vision.
Jobs are considered pivotal if they
are essential to convincing the
American taxpayer that NASA is
producing the desired result or
achieving the desired strategic
objective. They demonstrate that
the vision is becoming actualized.
Pivotal jobs might include
• The visionary leader, who
can see, smell, taste, feel
the fruition of the project
• The engineer, who ushers in
technological breakthroughs
• The entrepreneur, who spins
them off
• The scientist, who
methodically unfolds
discoveries
• The project manager, who
shepherds the contributions of
thousands of specialists within
the "real-world" parameters of
schedule and budget
• The communicator or
brainstormer, who constantly
stirs up, tears apart, refreshes,
revitalizes the organization
• The astronaut, who navigates
the spacecraft, who braves the
unknown, and who will explore,
develop, and inhabit space
beyond our Planet Earth
If we are to be a nation of
spacefarers, it is the astronaut
who holds the pivotal job of
demonstrating to the American
people that we are indeed venturing
out into space, navigating beyond
Planet Earth. However, if we are to
uncover the secrets of the universe,
the engineer, the scientist, the
brainstormer or communicator might
hold the pivotal job, as such tasks
embody the exhaustive search for
unnoticed relationships and their
significance.
The Focused Team
The projects on NASA's drawing
board are beyond the ability of any
single organization to implement,
let alone single individuals. So,
although it is critical that each
individual represent the very best
human potential our country has to
offer, each must also have the
uncanny ability to enrich, nourish,
and apply that expertise in pursuit
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of acommongoal,throughhighly
focusedteamwork.Theend-
productparametersmustbeclearly
defined,andtheaccumulating
insightmustbecontinouslyshared
amongteammembers.
Anindividualprofessional'skill
permitsreadyexecutionof a task
ata highlevelof competence.An
issueofconcernis thepotential
dichotomybetweenthehighly
specializedprofessionalndthe
highlysynergisticteam. Each
specialisthashisownvisionof
qualityachievementandhisown
sphereof personalinterests.Only
throughanover-articulated,single
noblevisioncansufficientenergy
beunleashedtoinspirealltoward
a commongoal. Suchapproaches
asestablishingbroadspheres
of responsibility,usingteams
extensively,andsearchingforjob
rotationopportunitiescontinuously
cannourishanabilityto see
connectionsandimplicationsand
fostermoreefficient,decentralized
decision-making.
Asanexample,Ingersoll-Rand
collapsedthedesigncycleof a new
handtoolto 1year--one-thirdthe
normaldevelopmenttime--by
breakingdownthebarrierswithin
theentrepreneurialteamand
allowingsales,marketing,
engineering,andmanufacturing
to workinunison;i.e.,getting
everyoneto "playinthesame
sandbox."To avoidthe"not-
invented-here"syndrome,acore
teamrepresentingallfunctional
areasheldweeklymeetingsto
ensurethat,amongotherthings,
allmembershada stakeinevery
stepandit wasa teamproject
(Kleinfield1990).
Stayingcenteredonthecreative
processandremainingalwaysfresh
andinnovativerequirestheability
to focus.TheBureaud'Economie
TheoriquetAppliquee(BETA)
researchgroupbelievesthat
innovationis,aboveall,a process.
BETAhasconductedfourlarge
researchprogramsinthepast
10years,includingastudyof
thespaceprogramto illustrate
technologicallearningorchange
withinanindustrialnetwork.They
haveconcludedthatinnovationis
anevolutionaryphenomenon
ratherthanasuddenhappening
(Zuscovitch,Heraud,and
Cohendet1988).
A compromisingenvironmentmay
getthejourneyunderway,but it
willnot leadto thefullnessof
"truth." Suchpressuresas
scoringachievementswithina
term-in-officetimeframe;restricting
a projecto certaincostlimits
dictatedbythenationaldebt;
establishingprematureinternational
collaborationsimplybecausewe
arebroke;stickingto knownand
establishedtechnologiesnomatter
howinapplicabletheymaybe;
readilyacceptingunproven
technologiesbecausethey're
supposedto becheaper-all
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thesepressuresconstrainthe
investigativeprocessandleadto
half-bakedresults.If wearegoing
to conductanexplorationprogram,
weshouldprovidethetimeand
moneyto dothejob right.
Wheredoesonebegin?Howto
achievechange,howto startthe
changeprocess,howto assess
whethermembersofthe
organizationarepreparedfor
change,howto handleobstacles
to progress--these are all issues
of concern, yet they are all
surmountable. The important point
to keep in mind is that organizations
change all the time. Change
readiness can be assessed at all
levels of the organization, jobs can
be redesigned, skills can be built,
and any vision, eagerly embraced,
can be brought to fruition.
The Coordination of Complexity
The most significant feature of the
NASA space program, as compared
to all the other programs on Earth
today, is the enormous complexity
of each individual project and the
cumulative complexity of the
program in its entirety. The simple
experience of engaging our minds
in the mastery of such megaoscale
products, processes, and projects
creates an expertise that serves us
well in all aspects of our economic
endeavors and in our global
competitive positioning. In
other words, this managerial
experience--in itself--provides a
unique competitive advantage to
our nation.
The Brilliant Achievement
What makes an achievement
stand out in our mind as brilliant
is colored by our vision. The
Apollo landing on the Moon is
an example of an impeccable
journey. The project was perfectly
timed, sequenced, and costed
out to run like clockwork. In
contrast, the Hubble Space
Telescope (fig. 4) has had a
sporadic history--on again, off
again--over a period of 40 years.
It was championed by one person,
Dr. Lyman Spitzer, from 1940 to
1950. Project Stratosphere, a
prototype 12-inch telescope
carried by balloon, was launched
in the 1950s. NASA took over in
the 1960s and successfully
launched two precursor
observation launches. Finally
completed and launched in April
1990 at the cost of $1.5 billion,
more than three times the original
projected cost of $435 million, the
Hubble telescope has been
riddled with difficulties, including
the discovery that one of the
mirrors was apparently ground to
the wrong curvature. Yet the
vision remained the same
throughout (Wilford 1990c).
Dr. Lyman Spitzer, now 75, wrote
in his first proposal for a space
telescope over 40 years ago that,
"The chief contribution of such a
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radically new and more powerful
instrument would be, not to
supplement our present ideas of
the universe we live in, but rather
to uncover new phenomena not yet
imagined, and perhaps to modify
profoundly our basic concepts of
space and time" (Wilford 1990c).
Under the vision of spacefaring,
this project might be regarded as
a disaster, because the spacefaring
vision focuses on the quality of the
journey. In fact, the journey was
terrible. The project was subject
to numerous postponements,
overruns, and delays, and it still
(1990) has serious problems even
after launch. Yet when the first
insightful photograph returns from
the telescope, if one of the answers
to the three key questions--How
fast is the universe expanding?
How old is the universe? What is
the fate of the universe?--is
disclosed, then, under the secret-
uncovering vision, this project will
have been a tremendous success.
Figure 4
The Hubble Space Telescope
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Section 2: Scoping a
Strategically Significant
Mission Agenda
The space program promises to
provide a chance to restore Planet
Earth to abundant health, a running
start on technology leaps beyond
our imagination, and access to
boundless resources.
The U.S. space program is
not the only driver of U.S.
technology.., but [it] is a
direct and major driver of
those kinds of technologies
that will drive the world
market of the next century.
(Anderson 1988)
The Space Industry will be a
leading indicator of all other
industries in the future--
Yukiko Minato, Ministry of
International Trade and
Industry, Japan. (Buell 1987)
In the long term, a key to
humanity's continued
evolution will be the
penetration of space and
the economic and scientific
exploitation of the solar
system's inexhaustible
resources and unique physical
characteristics. (Glaser 1989)
The United States has been a
trailblazer in space development.
Since the heady days of Apollo,
the United States has enjoyed a
reputation for unprecedented
large-scale project management
expertise, long-lasting unmanned
planetary exploration, a deep
institutional experience base in
NASA, and unparalleled aerospace
leadership--all decisive competitive
advantages that have benefited
commercial, as well as public
endeavors.
However, 20 to 30 years ago,
space exploration and development
programs were narrowly focused.
The science and engineering
problems faced today, such as
alloys, fuels, distances, are much
more complex than those wrestled
with during the Apollo Program. A
strategy needs to be formulated
that effectively allocates finite
resources among carefully selected
objectives in a sequence that
maximizes results. Important
strategic insights can be derived
from examining several potential
mission scenarios for NASA.
Remarkably, a close examination
of NASA demonstrates that the
agency has been active in
promoting and nurturing initiatives
across the board--in every
strategic space development
segment. President Bush seems
to want to continue a tradition of
independent, full-scale initiatives.
While the notion of international
participation was not entirely absent
from Bush's July 20, 1989, speech,
it was heavily overshadowed by a
nationalistic message: "What
Americans dream Americans
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cando." Weshouldpursuethese
goals"becauseit isAmerica's
destiny to lead." This phrasing
suggests that America is going to
pay the first 100 percent, and, if
others want to add on top of that,
they can (Chandler 1989). Such a
posture needs careful evaluation.
This paper reviews three
segmentations of the space
development arena to demonstrate
potential areas of strategic leverage
for NASA, as the agency seeks to
clarify its role and function within
the global space development
industry:
1. Consumer-driven innovation:
The entrepreneurial traits of
customer-driven innovation
and incessant scrutiny of the
marketplace are essential
components of effective market-
focused strategy development.
The only real "consumers" of the
space program are the citizens of
Planet Earth. It is eminently wise
to focus on their needs as buyers--
their higher needs for a healthy
planet for their children and their
children's children. The ability to
scrutinize profoundly the resource
components of Planet Earth and to
begin to understand the interaction
of economic and natural variables
promises to provide a contribution
by NASA and other national space
agencies around the world that is
unprecedented.
2. Capability-driven Innovation:
There are specific gaps in our
tools, products, and processes
that prevent prompt exploitation
of space. Nothing short of major
technological leaps must be
masterminded. The originators of
such technological breakthroughs
have typically seen them spin off
into lucrative commercial
ventures.
3. Destination-driven
innovation: The prospect of
setting up colonies on such
forbidding planetary bodies as the
Moon and Mars makes sense only
when the colony is viewed as a base
from which to exploit resources. To
access the rich resources of our
neighboring planets, to capitalize
on manufacturing breakthroughs
achieved only in low-gravity
conditions, to test the possibility
of transferring some of our heavily
polluting industries off Planet Earth
(taking care not to pollute our
neighboring planets)--these tasks
require a supporting infrastructure
that includes the advancement
of megaproject management
expertise. The colonization of
the Moon and Mars effectively
requires the creation of entirely
new industry and infrastructure
sectors, which will invariably have
a profound impact on our lifestyle
and business approaches on
Earth.
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In 1988 the National Academy
of Sciences recommended that
the United States undertake a
multibillion-dollar space science
initiative that would redirect the
U.S. space program in the early
21st century. They recommended
that
1. An intense, continuous
program be established to
monitor Earth's climate,
resources, and numerous
other factors important to the
planet's health.
, A search for planets in distant
solar systems be given a high
priority.
, A number of sample-return
missions be sent to nearby
space bodies.
. Many new missions in space
biology and medicine be
undertaken.
The first recommendation supports
the Mission to Planet Earth, the
second and third support
exploration efforts which are
preliminary to selecting a
destination, and the fourth
recommendation encourages
regenerative life support
technology--a capability to be
developed. These proposals, in
the report "Space Science in the
21st Century--Imperatives for
Decades 1995-2015," would
require NASA's budget to grow
significantly (Covault i988).
Consumer-Driven Innovation:
The Buslness of Protecting
Planet Earth
The "Planet Earth" consumer is
literally consuming the planet:
Consider the situation we
face on the eve of the 1990s:
We are generating waste,
both solid and hazardous,
at a rate far exceeding our
ability to dispose of it; global
temperatures are inching
upwards; our protective shield
of ozone is disappearing at
the same time as the
earthbound, harmful ozone
continues to exceed safe
levels in many of our cities;
acid rain is killing much of our
aquatic flora and fauna and
damaging many of our forests;
and the world population
has reached 5 billion and
continues to climb rapidly.
(Glass 1989)
More alarmingly, further growth is
essential: A fivefold to tenfold
increase in economic activity is
required over the next 50 years to
meet the needs and aspirations of
the world population and reduce
poverty. This will place a colossal
new burden on the ecosphere
(MacNeil 1989).
Space science has already proven
that it can contribute substantially
to our understanding of Earth's
problems: the greenhouse effect
on Venus and ozone depletion on
Mars provided insights that alerted
us to potential dangers in our own
atmosphere. Imagine how potent
direct focus by the international
space establishment on Planet
Earth promises to be. The Apollo 8
photo of our planet afloat in space
showed us that, as Buckminster
Fuller put it, we are passengers on
Spaceship Earth. The Earth is all
we've got--at least for now.
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All products brought to market on
Planet Earth follow a similar activity
flow from analyzing the market and
customer need, through designing
the product, purchasing or
sourcing the raw materials, and
manufacturing, to distributing and
selling the product (see table 2).
There are three critical roles that
NASA could play in the United
States, other national space
agencies could play in their
respective countries, and all these
agencies could play jointly on
Planet Earth to align business
activities with ecology-preserving
systems:
Provide an information base
for delimiting constructive and
destructive use of resources
on Planet Earth.
Provide technology design
initiatives that demonstrate
regard for ecological
limitations.
Participate in policy
formulation efforts intended
to promote global industrial
restructuring-including
consideration of transferring
the most polluting industrial
activities to off-planet
locations.
Market Research: Point the way to
save the planet
Growth must be structured in ways
that keep its enormous potential for
environmental transformation within
safe limits--limits which are yet to
be determined. Clearly defining the
parameters within which Planet
Earth can be restored to health can
provide powerful directives. For
example, one author states that to
stabilize concentrations of carbon
dioxide at present levels, an
immediate reduction in global
manmade emissions--chiefly from
the burning of such fossil fuels as
coal and oil--by 60 to 80 percent
would be necessary (Shabecoff
1990a).
TABLE 2. The Business System for Bringing a Product to Market on Planet Earth
Define Design , Deliver
Market _1 d_i _' ring_l
research Technical Sourcing Manufactu trut  C°
sales/servic_//_
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NASAhasaprojectunderway
which may identify just such
degrees of tolerance: The
Mission to Planet Earth is a "global
habitability mission" (Brown 1989)
involving a very substantial purely
scientific component directed
toward real human problems. It is
intended to point the way to save
the planet. Also referred to as
Earth Observing System (EOS),
it is an international initiative
consisting of five giant orbiting
platforms [two from NASA, two
from the European Space Agency
(ESA), and one from the National
Space Development Agency
(NASDA) of Japan], each carrying
the largest and most sophisticated
array of remote-sensing instruments
ever assembled. The mission
will begin a 15-year period of
observation in the mid-1990s. This
will become one of the largest space
science projects ever, costing the
United States $1 billion per year
(Cook 1989).
The list of critical processes that
impact Planet Earth's ecological
system and must be monitored is
extensive, including changes in
concentrations of greenhouse
gases and their impact on
temperature; the effect of ocean
circulation on the timing and
distribution of climatic changes; the
role of vegetation in regulating the
flux of water between land and
atmosphere; global circulation and
processing of major chemical
elements such as carbon, oxygen,
nitrogen, phosphorus, and sulfur-
principal components of life--as
well as carbon dioxide, methane,
and nitrous oxide (More than
70 000 chemicals synthesized
by humans affect the global
environment.); and processes of
evaporation and precipitation, runoff
and circulation (Clark 1989).
The end product of this
international undertaking will be an
information base for decision-
making--the findings of scientific
research and planetary monitoring.
It is hoped that the environmental
impact of business decisions will be
demonstrated in a fact-based
manner. The real environmental
costs of human activities have not
been isolated to date; thus,
calculations of business efficiencies
have been skewed in favor of the
convenient. The dilemma involved
in choosing process technologies,
governed as they are now by
private, generally short-term, profit-
maximizing responses to market
forces rather than long-term
concerns about environmental
quality, could more effectively be
resolved with the data base that
Mission to Planet Earth promises
to assemble.
President Bush has expressed his
willingness to prevent compromise
while appreciating the need to
redefine business standards in the
marketplace: "To those who
suggest we're only trying to
balance economic growth and
environmental protection, I say they
miss the point. We are calling for
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an entirely new way of thinking, to
achieve both while compromising
neither, by applying the power of
the marketplace in the service of
the environment" (Shabecoff
1990b).
Technical Design: Define
environmentally safe products
and processes
Technologies that can be utilized
on the scale necessary to support
sustainable economic development
must be resource-conserving,
pollution-preventing, and
environment-restoring, and
themselves economically
supportable. Sheer invention is
the only effective way out of our
major ecological problems, as the
very technological foundations of
our economy need to be totally
revised. What we need is an
economy that will not consume
scarce resources and will not
generate pollution.
Begin with the environmental
constraints and then design the
product: NASA is initiating a
process that it believes may serve
as a model for government,
industry, and environmental
groups. Its cornerstone is getting
together before a technology is
developed to determine what
technological advances must be
made to render a product or
process environmentally and
economically acceptable. Looking
at the environmental issues ahead
of hardware issues, they have
even gone one step further:
they have resolved not to develop
the product or process if the
environment is compromised
(Leary 1990). In the case in
point--development of a high-
speed passenger plane--walking
away would be enormously difficult,
as competition stands in the wings:
Aerospatiale, the French aircraft
company, is studying the next-
generation supersonic transport
to replace the Concorde; the
Japanese government has begun
serious research; and the Soviet
Union has begun studies on a
transport plane that could fly at
5 times the speed of sound
(Leary 1990).
Preliminary studies commissioned
by NASA indicate that building such
an aircraft is possible. However,
current aircraft technology,
including the best materials and
engines, could not produce an
acceptable aircraft, according to
Boeing. The Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory concurs,
having calculated that a fleet of
500 supersonic airliners using
existing engine technology would
seriously deplete the ozone layer
by 15 to 20 percent, almost
3 times the damage from
chlorofluorocarbons. NASA plans
to spend $284 million over the next
5 years to find out whether the
required technological advances to
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developanenvironmentallysafe
high-speedplanecanbeachieved.
Theprogramwillcenterinitiallyon
airportnoise,sonicbooms,and
engineemissionsthatcould
reducetheatmosphere's
protectiveozonelayer(Leary
1990).
Experiment with new processes
that will protect the environment:
Ecologically safe life support
is being pioneered in the
Biosphere II Project, a
complete environment
contained under 3 acres of
glass (see fig. 5). Billed as
the most exciting scientific
experiment since the lunar
landing, the airtight structure
will contain 20 000 square
feet of farm, where all the
food will be grown. There
will also be a desert, ocean,
marsh, savannah, and
rainforest (with 3800 species
from ladybugs and shrimp to
fowl and deer), laboratory,
library, and apartments.
Eight scientists will spend
2 uninterrupted years inside
the project, which is designed
to simulate life in a space
colony, beginning in
September 1990 (Dawson
1989). Biosphere II is a
private, profit-oriented
project operated by Space
Biospheres Ventures. Most
of the $37 million for the
4-year-old enterprise has
been donated by Texas
multimillionaire Edward Bass
(Steacy 1988). The intent is
to restore environmentally
damaged areas on Planet
Earth as well as advance
NASA's exploratory
programs. Techniques
under development include
chemical-free farming, natural
pest-removers, crop rotation,
and new ways to recycle
nutrients through the soil
and purify both air and water.
The entrepreneurs believe
that an ecological industry
can turn a profit and that
working with the flow of
nature should cost less in the
long run. They expect to
market the new methods
and equipment they are
developing.
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Figure 5
Biosphere II
This huge terrarium was built near Tucson
with private financing in 1989 and will be
occupied by a collection of 3800 species
(including eight Homo sapiens) for an
uninterrupted 2-year period starting in
1990.
The 3-acre, airtight, glass and frame
structure includes five wilderness biomes.
From a mountain in the center of the
rainforest, a stream cascades down a
waterfall and across the forest floor. It
flows along a savannah, at the top of the
rock cliffs, through fresh- and saltwater
marshes to a 25-foot-deep ocean, which
encompasses a coral reef. A thornscrub
forest makes the transition between the
savannah and a desert, the biome that
most nearly matches the external
environment.
!
Behind the wilderness biomes in this view
are the 24 O00-square-foot intensive
agriculture biome and the six-story,
domed human habitat biome. The natural
processes in Biosphere II will be artificially
assisted by two "lungs," to accommodate
warm air expansion, which would otherwise
blow out glass panes or break the seals,
and by air and water circulation systems,
because the unit is not large enough to
generate weather processes.
Its developers believe that not only is such
a controlled ecological fife support system
applicable to future space colonies but
also the techniques developed such as
chemical-free farming may be useful in
restoring to environmental health parts of
Biosphere I- our Planet Earth.
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Ecologically safe power
generation can be achieved
by generating power via
satellites for use on the
ground as well as in space.
The feasibility Of new solar
power technologies to collect
and beam power between
objects in space and the
Earth needs to be tested. It
is not yet clear which orbits
and which portions of the
electromagnetic spectrum
would best be used to
transmit energy to Earth from
space (Glaser 1989).
Ecologically safe waste
treatment can be achieved
through transfer of a NASA-
developed technology to
Planet Earth municipalities•
The NASA Technology
Utilization Office, which
encourages non-space
applications of technology
developed by NASA,
transferred the first Planet
Earth application of the
artificial marsh filtering system
(intended to treat wastewater
in space colonies--research
began in 1971) to a local
municipality in Haughton,
Louisiana, in 1986. An
11-acre lagoon and a 70- by
900-foot gravel bed with
rooted aquatic plants were
set up (see fig. 6). Highly
effective (bacterial levels
were far below permitted
limits), the process was also
found to be highly cost-
effective (only a fraction of
the cost of the conventional
approach). Presently 15 to
20 systems are on-line
or in the design phase
throughout the United
States (Dawson 1989). Figure 6
Natural Wastewater Treatment
At Haughton, Louisiana,town officials
installed a second-generation version of
NASA's natural wastewater treatment
system. The raw wastewater is pumped
into the lagoon, where floating water
hyacinths digest enormous amounts of
pollutants. Then the water flows over a
rock bed populated by microbes that
cleanse the water further. Aquatic plants
growing in the gravel bed--bulrushes in
the foreground and canna lilies in the
background-absorb more pollutants and
help deodorize the sewage Although
water hyacinths are fimited to warm
climates and fresh water, bulrushes and
canna filies can tolerate both cold and
salt water.
BLACK ,,_ r,_.,4;, WHITE PH,DTOGRAPH
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It is importantto notethatarashof
newproductinnovationscould
fostereconomicgrowthat levels
unseento date.
Sourcing Manufacturing 
Distribution: Spearhead global
industrial restructuring
All of our activities have
environmental consequences,
and all of our activities must be
changed rapidly if our rendezvous
with disaster is to be halted.
The challenge facing humanity
in the '90s is to reverse the
environmental degradation of
the planet before it leads to
economic decline .... Meeting
this challenge requires more
than fine-tuning; it will take a
fundamental restructuring of
the global economy. (Brown
1990)
Any blueprint for an environmentally
sustainable global economy would
require the following.
Eliminate sources of pollution:
Some pollutants have been
successfully removed from the
atmosphere. In each case--lead,
DDT, PCBs, strontium 90--
substantial improvement was
achieved not by tacking a control
device onto the process that
generates the pollutant but by
eliminating the pollutant from the
production process itself
(Commoner 1990).
Replace environmentally assaulting
production technologies with
inherently pollution-free processes:
Ecologically and economically
sound technologies do exist.
If farmers would shift to
organic agriculture, the rising
tide of agricultural chemicals
that now pollute water
supplies would be reversed
and food would be free of
pesticide-derived carcinogens.
If automobiles were powered
by stratified-charge engines,
which sharply reduce nitrogen
oxide emissions, the urban
pall of photochemical smog
and ozone--which is triggered
by nitrogen oxides--would be
lifted.
If electricity were produced by
photovoltaic cells, directly
from sunlight, the air could be
freed of the noxious pollutants
generated by conventional
power plants.
If the use of plastics were
limited to those products for
which they are essential,
we could push back the
petrochemical industry's toxic
invasion of the environment.
(Commoner 1990)
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Consider transferring the major
eroders of Planet Earth off planet:
The components of growth and
globalization of human activity that
have had the greatest impact on
the environment from 1850 to the
present are agriculture, the
dominant agent of global land
transformation--9 million square
kilometers of surface has been
converted to cropland; energy,
which has risen by a factor of 80;
manufacturing, which has
increased a hundredfold in
100 years; and basic metals,
which has experienced a long-
term growth greater than 3 percent
per year. Each of these could
conceivably be transferred off
Planet Earth: agriculture, using
biosphere or hydroponic
techniques; energy, using solar
power transmission to the Earth;
manufacturing, possibly using
robots on the Moon; and mining
of basic metals on the Moon,
asteroids, or Mars. What better
justification for going to the Moon
or Mars than to make life better for
the Planet Earth consumed
Eliminate indifferent public policies:
Current public policies have been
found to actively encourage
deforestation, desertification,
destruction of habitat and species,
and decline of air and water quality
(Clark 1989). Mechanisms, both
national and international, need
to be developed to coordinate
managerial activities pertaining
to ecologically safe industrial
restructuring. Local development
actions have cumulative results on
the global environment that are
difficult to communicate, short of
demonstrating them from a
vantage point in tow Earth orbit.
Science can help, but it is efforts
that go beyond science to
formulating adaptive policies that
encompass environmental
surprises which will ultimately
determine our effectiveness as
managers of Planet Earth.
Capability-Driven Innovation:
The Process of Engineering
Critical Technological
Advances
Science seemed at its birth to
be but superfluity and fantasy,
the product of an exuberant
overflow of inward activity
beyond the sphere of the
material necessities of life, the
fruit of the curiosity of dreamers
and idlers. Then, little by little,
it achieved an importance and
an effectiveness .... We who
live in a world which it
revolutionized acknowledge
its social significance and
sometimes even make it the
object of a cult. Nevertheless
we still leave it to grow as best
it can, hardly tending to it at all,
like those wild plants whose
fruits are plucked by primitive
peoples in their forests.
(de Chardin 1972, p. 129)
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Our technological capabilities
have not yet reached a level that
facilitates realization of our
loftiest goals. And the level of
technological capability determines
the effectiveness of our efforts and
their cost efficiencies. We cannot
mobilize a program to colonize the
Moon or Mars within the next
3-5 years, for example, precisely
because our current technology
makes it economically infeasible.
Getting materials and people into
space simply costs too much; we
don't know what's there--except
on a superficial level--or how it can
be used; and we are not sure that
we can remain alive for any
TABLE 3. Priority Issues in a Space
Independent variables
Getting into space:
launch vehicle economics
(highly competitive)
Living healthily in space:
sustainable life support systems
Working productively in space:
facility in which to experiment
(ex., space station)
extended period of time, let alone
return to Earth without having been
debilitated in some way. The most
critical impediments to space
exploration are the lack of cost-
effective means to leave the pull of
the Earth's gravity, the availability
of only a rudimentary controlled
ecological life support system, and
the inability to conduct research on
space phenomena in enough depth
to develop innovative products and
processes (table 3). These are
effectively the independent
variables-or the problems whose
resolution will facilitate a broad
range of subsequent projects and
programs.
Technology Development Program
Dependent variables
Vehicle size
Cargo capacity
Fuel type
Length of stay in space
Distance travelable
Development of new products &
processes for commercial
manufacturing
Renewable power supply
Intervening variables (could significantly change the game rules)
Discovery of other life in the universe, perhaps more intelligent (and therefore having many
capabilities already in hand) or distant (thus changing our target destination)
Major breakthrough8 in speed of travel, perhaps rendering Mars less interesting (because we
can go farther) or more interesting (because we can get there faster)
Inability to sustain life on a long-term basis outside of Earth's atmosphere, or prohibitive
hardship in doing so
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TheNational Research Council,
an arm of the congressionally
chartered National Academy of
Sciences, believes that it is vital
that Moon-Mars missions have "the
capability to send humans into
space, maintain them in a physical
condition that permits them to work
productively, and return them to
Earth in good health." It has not
been demonstrated that after long-
duration space flight individuals can
readjust rapidly to gravity without
serious physiological consequences
("U.S. Panel" 1990).
One way to ensure that the effort is
sustained is to make sure that the
basics are in place: to focus for a
time on technology development,
to reduce the operational costs of
spacefaring and to establish the
facilities and systems--the
infrastructure--that a serious
program requires (Sawyer 1989).
To respond to existing technology
constraints, to be able to break
through the current quality/cost
parameters, we need to develop a
targeted, thoughtful technology
advancement program. A
segmentation based on capabilities
in hand, and capabilities required,
brings to the surface the major
technology gaps to be bridged
(table 4). Mastery of these
technologies is most likely to open
up space activities to the broadest
possible constituency. When
the costs of getting into space,
surviving in space, and producing
in space are sufficiently reduced,
an infrastructure can be built to
nurture the wealth-generating
efforts of small entrepreneurs
and independent individuals, as
well as major corporations and
governmental agencies.
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TABLE 4. U.S. Mission Scenarios: Capability-Driven Innovation
Capability Technological impediments Proposed projects/requirements
Space Economic access to space • Shuttle C unmanned cargo version
transpor- of Space Shuttle
tation • New generaton heavy lift rocket,
to lift 300 000 Ib +
• Aerospace plane--advanced
propulsion, horizontal take-off
• Civil Space Technology Institute
(CSTI), to increase operating
margins of propulsion hardware
Maneuverability in orbit • Exploration Technologies
R&D Program, to develop
technology for operations
beyond Earth orbit
• Develop two orbital vehicles
• Develop in-space assembly
capability
• Develop system for storing
propellants in Earth orbit for later use
• Develop small, reusable moonship
that separates into lander and
orbiting module
• Develop accurate and safe
autonomous landing, rendezvous,
and docking and sample retrieval
Deep space travel • Develop a rocket powerful enough
to reach Mars
Sufficient power supply • Construct energy forms to
beam power to Earth (NASA
Lewis/Harris solar concentrator)
. Develop space-based nuclear
reactors (JPL SP-100;
Westinghouse Multimegawatt
Space Nuclear Power Supply)
• Mine the Moon for alternative
energy sources
• Develop advanced chemical
propulsion
Advanced
technology
Automation and robotics
breakthroughs
Develop advanced "intelligent
systems" technology to reduce
cost of unmanned probes
Advanced data and
computer system
breakthroughs
Develop advanced computer
technology to reduce
cost of unmanned probes
5O
TABLE4 (concluded).
Capability Technological impediments Proposed projects/requirements
Life Substitute gravity • Modify the impact of microgravity
sciences on human systems by exercise,
artificial gravity, autogenic feedback
training, and nutrition (NASA Ames)
• Understand interdependence of
musculoskeletal, cardiovascular, and
endocrine systems in low and artificial
gravity (Space Station Freedom)
• Determine the effects of extended
weightlessness on humans
Sustainable food supply • Experiment with hydroponics space
farm that uses nutrient-rich solutions
instead of soil
• Develop serf-sustaining system from
growing fruits and vegetables in
space
Closed water/waste
treatment system
• Biosphere II, a complete environment
under 3 acres of glass
• Controlled ecological life support
system (CELSS)
• Bioregenerative life support to
generate oxygen, supply fresh food,
remove excess carbon dioxide
Shelter • Develop building materials and alloys
from lunar ore
• Test use of spherical inflatable
housing structure made of Kevlar
(Lawrence Livermore Natl. Lab)
Oxygen • Extract oxygen from lunar materials
for use in life support systems and as
propellant
Remote health care • Develop clinical health maintenance
facility
Sources: Berry 198g; Covault 1989d; "Gardens in Space," Los Angeles Times 4-2-89; Harford 1989; Henderson
1989; Sawyer ! 989; Westinghouse 1989.
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The funding requirements to
achieve such technological
advances are difficult to estimate:
A dichotomy exists between the
cost to make the leap and the
cost savings achieved as a
result of the leap. Since the
breakthrough has not yet been
achieved, Jt is impossible to
predict how many false starts
must be surmounted in the
struggle up the learning curve
to success (table 5). Such
development does not necessarily
follow a straight line; it is often a
series of iterations, evolutionary in
its unfolding. Because these
"technological leap" projects
cannot even guarantee that
success will be attained, they are
by definition high-risk. However,
achievement of the breakthrough
provides enormous rewards to the
technology owner and permanently
redefines the competitive arena to
the advantage of the breakthrough
innovator. Because the efforts are
often very expensive, they are
increasingly undertaken on an
industry-wide basis; because the
results can be very lucrative, they
are often kept secret from other
nations--guarded like the national
treasures they are.
TABLE 5. The Life Cycle of a Technological Breakthrough
Phases
I Concep %
model u_
Experimental
Pre_lairlnei__rY &_
design/
dev_lo
Developmental Operational
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Cost exposure can be reduced
through partnerships among
government agencies, industry,
academia, and entrepreneurs
from the same country--or via
international partnerships. When
a government participates in a
project, supported by public
financing, the results of the
activity are typically in the
public domain. Alternatively,
government agencies may fund
corporations and entrepreneurial
companies conducting research
and developing products, often
with the understanding that what
they learn in the process can be
privately held and spun off into
commercial products.
A review of the national space
development strategies of
selected countries reveals that
while the United States is
launching initiatives in a broad
range of arenas (manned and
unmanned), most of the other
major participants, with the
exception of the Soviet Union,
have restricted their immediate
goals to profitable commercial
applications while seeking
independence in space as a
long-term objective (table 6).
This suggests that European,
Japanese, and other participants
are viewing space development
from a highly competitive,
commercial vantage point. While
they are seeking full autonomy in
space, they are willing to joint
venture in the short term (they say)
in order to catch up. Overall,
space is viewed as a terrain in
which major technological leads
can be developed and sustained.
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TABLE 6. National Space Development Strategies: A Comparison
Country/agency Focus Philosophy Strengths/weaknesses
U.SA./NASA Unmanned Massive
exploration technological
Manned leaps in R&D
spacefaring objectives
Bush commitment to
take a fresh look
Continually changing
vision/funding
U.S.S.R. Put man on Gradual
Mars within development
next 25 years of space
capabilities
Management sharply
criticized
Europe/ESA Propulsion Full autonomy
technologies in space by
year 2000
Reluctant to commit
financing
Has technical ability
to be a major space
power but seems to
lack political will
required to achieve
most cost-effective
results
Japan/
NASDA
($t.1 billion)
Institute of Space
& Astronautical
Sciences
(St 14 million)
Commercial- Good space
ization science doesn't
need to be
expensive
Heavily subsidized by
Japanese private
companies
A late start because
no military expenditure,
but reshaping program
for t 990s
Canada/Canadian
Space Agency
($1 billion + )
Robotics Cooperate to
participate in
new technology
development
Robotics a Canadian
strength
Target strategic
technologies that
make possible the
mission-critical mobile
servicing system
India/Indian Commercial-
Space Research ization
Organization
(ISRO)
Attract industry
through
divesting
management &
technical
operation of
selected
facilities to
industry
Guarantees t5% profit
margin on projects
Encourages honing
technical skills
Deemed "export,"
entitles suppliers to
huge tax concessions
Sources: Bennett 1987; De Cotrel 1988; Gibson 1984; Kapur 1987; Lenorovitz 1988a, b, c; "Soviets Put
Cralt," New York Times 1-30-89
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This focus on capability
development may appear low-key
to the general public when
compared to more visible Moon
or Mars projects, because it is
technology-centered and forces
repetitive iterations to uncover the
product or process dynamics in
enough depth to engineer a major
innovation. However, our success
in advancing our capabilities will
ensure the smooth implementation
of those more visible, destination-
focused projects.
Getting Into Space: Propulsion
The single most frustrating problem
related to space development is
the prohibitive cost of getting
vehicles, materials, and people
into space. Once out of Earth's
gravity field, there are additional
issues regarding maneuverability
and propulsion through deep space.
The pace of commercialization,
however, depends on the pace
of the launching business.
Concept for a Heavy Lift Launch
Vehicle Derived from the Space
Shuttle
By replacing the Shuttle's manned orbiter
with a cargo carrier, the payload capacity
of the space transportation system can
be increased by 2-3 times over current
capacity per launch. Costs should also
be lower.
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Figure 7
Concept for the National Aerospace
Plane
Artist: Stan H. Stokes (NASA Art Program
Collection)
Technologies developed for the national
aerospace plane (and spinoffs from that
technology development) would greatly
improve the competitive position of the
United States in the aerospace field. This
revolutionary class of vehicles would be
able to take off and land horizontally on
standard runways like a conventional
airplane, cruise in the upper atmosphere
at hypersonic speed, or fly directly into
Earth orbit.
Its "scramjet" engines would burn a
mixture of hydrogen and air, thus obviating
the need to carry liquid oxygen. Its
horizontal takeoff and landing (HOTOL)
capability would eliminate the need for
vertical launch facilities currently required
for the Space Shuffle and unmanned
boosters. These two capabilities should
allow the spaceplane to deliver payloads
to orbit at a fraction of today's cost.
The technologies are applicable to
supersonic (above Mach 2, or 1300 mph)
military transports and hypersonic (above
4000 mph) civil planes that could fly
passengers from the United States to
Japan in 2 hours.
The phase of the joint Department of
Defense/NASA effort which began in 1986
involves development of key technologies
in propulsion, aerodynamics, advanced
structures, high-temperature materials,
and computational fluid dynamics.
Computer simulation is used to "fly"
mathematical models of the national
aerospace plane, which must attain
17 000 mph (Mach 25) to escape Earth's
gravity and reach orbit.
Experimental-skills beyond a
single organization: The most
impressive propulsion project
being developed today is the
national aerospace plane (see
fig. 7). Regarded as of profound
strategic urgency, it is expected to
have a major effect on the course
of U.S. space and aeronautics
development into the 21st century
as well as a tremendous impact on
American competitiveness in the
aerospace field, which is our
number 1 export category. A direct
counter to similar efforts under way
by the Europeans, the Japanese,
and the Soviets, it is expected to
be completed by 1997 (3 to 5 years
ahead of the others).
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Particle Tracings Over the Space
Shuttle Imaged by NASA'sNumerical
Aerodynamic Simulator
The effect of hypersonic airflow upon
such vehicles cannot be tested in wind
tunnels, which go no higher thanMach 8.
NASA'sNumerical Aerodynamic Simulation
Facility,located at Ames Research Center,
is using Cray supercomputers to build to an
eventual capabilityof 10 billioncalculations
per second. Such computational capability
will not only provide enormous impetus to
aerospace development but also permit
major advances in other structural design,
materials research, chemistry, and
meteorology.
A team of private industry contractors
is sharing development costs with
the Government and operating as a
noncompetitive consortium to share
research data, keep costs down, and
quicken the pace of technology.
The national aerospace plane is
sure to be a major technological
leap if achieved, because never
before has an experimental aircraft
been designed to fly so much
faster and higher than any other
plane (Covault 1989a). Its design
parameters are to
• Achieve a speed of
17 000 mph to escape
Earth's gravitational pull
and reach orbit
• Circle the globe in
90 minutes
• Withstand a temperature of
3000°F
• Have engines designed to
gulp oxygen from the air
Determine the effect of
hypersonic atmospheric
chemistry
(Lavin 1989)
Clear standards of cost-
effectiveness have been defined
for the national aerospace plane:
• Must be cheaper to operate
than the Shuttle and require
less manpower
• Must be able to use any
standard airport in the world
(Lavin 1989)
57
Whatis remarkableabouthis
programistheextentof national-
level,industry-widecollaboration
focusedonthiscritical
technologicalbreakthrough.
Trulythebestskillshavebeen
broughto bearon thetask. The
projectteamincludesNASA,the
Pentagon,andfiveU.S.aerospace
companiesledbytheAirForce
(threeairframemanufacturersand
twoenginemanufacturers).In
effect,allofthemajorcompetitors
in theaerospaceindustryhave
beeninvitedto participatequally--
on a level playing field. Take the
development work for_tSe heat'
resistant material! None of the
companies could afford to do all
the research alone, so each has
specialized in one type of material,
sharing the results with all
competitors. Discussions are
under way regarding ways to
collaborate in building the plane
itself (Lavin 1989).
What is alarming is that our
leadership in this area is not
secured, and major competitors
have set their sights on the same
goals. The European Space
Agency, representing 13 European
countries, has a three-pronged
space program that includes a fifth-
generation Ariane heavy lift rocket,
a module of Space Station
Freedom, and three versions of the
horizontal take-off and landing
aircraft (table 7). This horizontal
take-off technology is regarded as
so critical that the Europeans
cannot agree on who should lead
the project, where it should be
headquartered, or how it should be
engineered.
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TABLE7. European Space Agency: Three-Pronged Space Program*
Program Scope Participants Est. budget
Ariane V Liquid hydrogen & France 45% $3.5 billion
heavy lift oxygen fuel W. Germany 22%
rocket Max. load 100 000 kg Italy 15%
Will double launch Others 18%
capability
Hermes Target launch 1996-7 Avions Dassault-Breguet
piloted (engineering)
spaceplane Aerospatiale
(coordination)
(45% French funding)
$4.4 billion
"HOTOL"
(Horizontal
Take-Off
& Landing)
(three
alternatives)
U.K. alternative Upgraded version of
Concorde: horizontal
take-off, air-breathing
engines to boost to
near vertical trajectory,
horizontal return
British Aerospace
Sanger
(W. German
alternative)
A small reusable
spacecraft launched
from back of aircraft,
reaching orbit on own
power, then gliding
back to Earth
W. German
aerospace
companies
Columbus Part of U.S.A.-led
Space int. space station
Module project
13 member
states
$3.7 billion
"ESA is reluctant to commit to all three key space projects.
Sources: Dickson 1986, 1987; Mordoff 1988.
59
Developmental- synergies and
interfaces: The United States is
ahead in low-cost rockets for small
payloads, thanks to Orbital and
other small entrepreneurial
organizations. Orbital Sciences
Corporation developed a 50-foot,
winged rocket, the Pegasus, and
launched it from a B-52 flying over
the Pacific Ocean. (See figure 8.)
Pegasus' winged design is a first
for unmanned rockets, giving the
vehicle the extra lift it needs to
head toward orbit most efficiently
from a horizontal airborne launch.
Developed to address the needs of
"microspace" (that is, smaller and
more affordable rockets and
satellites), it is intended to launch
"lightsats," a new class of satellites.
The objective of this highly focused
development strategy was to
provide space-oriented products
and services that appeal to a wider
group of governments, companies,
and entrepreneurial consumers.
This down-sizing effectively reduces
the cost per pound of payloads in
orbit, a critical factor in developing
a broader based commercial space
industry.
Figure 8
The Pegasus Rocket
Designed and built by Orbital Sciences
Corporation and Hercules Aerospace
Company and sponsored by NASA and
DARPA (the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency), this 50-foot-long,
winged rocket is carried aloft by a B-52
before the first of its three motors is
ignited. Its down-sizing is intended to
offer much lower cost for the delivery to
orbit of fightweight sate/rites.
BLACK AND WttlTE PHOTC'GF_AFH
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Once Orbital's rocket is made
operational, the company expects
to sell commercial launches for
$6-7 million or $6000 per pound of
payload (versus $20 000 per pound
for small satellites carried by other
lightweight payload rockets, such
as the Scout rocket by L'IV
Corporation). It is important to
observe the amount of Government
support required for such
entrepreneurial efforts: The
Pentagon's Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) paid $6.5 million to Orbital
for the launching, making the
project economically feasible, and
NASA provided the B-52 for the
launch, effectively establishing the
credibility of the provider. NASA
and DARPA are considered to be
anchor customers--the largest and
most sophisticated consumers of
space products, consumers whose
needs create the demand for, and
define the parameters of, new
products and processes to be
developed (Stevenson 1990).
Operational-indicators of success:
The unmanned vertical rocket
launch business is an established
technology, in an established
industry, with heavy global
competition. A $2 billion worldwide
industry, the commercial launch of
satellites is forecast to continue to
grow through the 1990s. As
communications networks are
being privatized and deregulated
worldwide, even more activity can
be expected (Cook and Lewis
1988).
There have been two keys to
success in operating a launch
business:
• The right product
Europeans believed that unmanned
launchers such as Ariane would
continue to offer the better solution
for launching satellites that do not
require the presence of astronauts.
The primary goal of Arianespace
was to give Europe an independent
launch capability for its own
satellites (Dickson 1986), but the
result has been to provide a
competitive advantage in the
international marketplace
(Lenorovitz 1988a, b, c). Ariane of
Arianespace has averaged about
a 50-percent share of the global
launch market, also taking a share
from the Space Shuttle after the
Challenger disaster. Forty-three
satellites were launched between
the beginning of Ariane's
commercial program, in 1981, and
1990. More than 32 launches are
scheduled, as of February 1990, at
a value of $2.36 billion. Launches
have been suspended twice: once
in May 1986 and again in February
1990, both times to allow for
inquiries into explosions of rockets
in flight, destroying their satellite
cargoes ("Panel To Examine"
1990). Ariane must adhere to a
rapid and sustained launch rate if it
is to fulfill the orders currently on
its books and to compete for new
business.
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TABLE 8.
• The right price
The Space Shuttle, a manned
vertical launch vehicle, was
expected to command 75 percent
of the global launch business
when envisioned by Nixon in the
1970s. We were first in a market
that was wide open--but with the
wrong price parameters. The
lower the launch cost, the broader
the customer base. However,
we somehow got locked into a
technology that is not cost-
effective. Although it has been a
superb research vehicle and it has
taught us how to design a reusable
reentry vehicle that could bring
material back from space, the
overriding reason it was built was to
lower costs. Reusable has turned
out to mean "uncorrectable." The
Shuttle's overhead cost is $3 billion
a year, excluding the hidden costs
in salaries (10 000 people are
required at Cape Kennedy to
launch it). At only eight or ten
flights a year, the cost is at least
$300 million per flight (Brown
1989). After the Challenger
accident, President Reagan
determined that private companies
would handle all commercial
launches (Peterson and Schares
1988).
Three U.S. companies (McDonnell
Douglas, Martin Marietta, and
General Dynamics) are going head
to head with companies abroad for
business (see table 8) and have
occasionally enjoyed a cost
advantage depending on the
changing value of the dollar.
Ariane is considered to be an equal
competitor with the United States in
heavy-launching capacity, and the
Japanese are catching up fast.
Worldwide Commercial Launch Market, a $2 Billion Space Transportation Industry
Company Rocket Payload capacity, Cost/launch, Success rate,
Ib (kg) $ million %
McDonnell Douglas Delta II 4 000 (1800) 50
Martin Marietta Titan III 10 000 (4500) 110
General Dynamics Atlas-Centaur 5 200 (2400) 59
Ariane IV 9 200 (4200) 85
China Long March 3 4 000 (1800) 35
U.S.S.R. Proton 4 800 (2200) 36
Japan (Will begin competing in 1993)
98
96
95
80
Sources: Cook and Lewis 1988, Feder 1900, Peterson and Schares 1988.
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Pricecompetitionis stiff. For
example,Chinatypicallybeats
Ariane'ssatellitelaunchpriceby
severalmilliondollarsandusually
agreesto underwrite$30-60million
insuranceonthelaunchfora
premium15to 20percentbelow
worldrates(PetersonandSchares
1988)asa wayof buyinga larger
shareof themarket.
Living Healthily in Space: Full
functioning
Human spacefaring is only
worthwhile if it is a peak
experience--that is, if really
challenging and creative work can
be done in space. For humans to
be as productive in space as they
are on Earth, their life support
system must be totally integrated,
leaving individuals whole and
intact, so that their functions are
not in any way impaired.
Life Sciences received only
$124 million of NASA's
$13.3 billion budget for fiscal year
1990. Without understanding the
scope of research required to
resolve the critical issues, it is
difficult to say whether that is too
little or too much. At first glance,
however, it appears that life
support research is less advanced
than other areas of space
engineering and science.
Life support: To date, it has
been possible to send astronauts
into space with a full stock of
expendables such as air, water,
and food without regeneration
because of the short timeframes of
the missions undertaken. Since
resupply would be impossible at
a location like Mars, which is
2-3 years away from Earth,
resources would have to be
reclaimed and reused more and
more, or else mined, grown, or
otherwise produced onsite. Work
is under way on a partially closed
air and water system for the space
station, which may be sufficient for
initial trips to the Moon and Mars.
It may be desirable to extend the
system to a self-monitored and
self-controlled ecological life
support system that turns metabolic
and other waste into food, potable
water, and a breathable atmosphere
by integrating biological, physical,
and chemical processes (Aaron et
al. 1989).
A controlled ecological life support
system (CELSS) program was
initiated by NASA in the late
1970s. The long-term goal is to
devise a bioregenerative support
system to generate oxygen, supply
fresh food, and remove excessive
carbon dioxide from the station.
By reducing the amount of
expendables that must be
carried into space, the system is
expected to lower operating costs.
Essentially, CELSS uses biological
systems to recycle air, water, and
waste products (Hubbard 1989). A
physical/chemical version of this
system is planned for Space
Station Freedom. This system will
recycle the water and air supply
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usingnonbiologicaltechnology.
A moreadvancedsystemwhich
incorporatesplantsandfood
productionisbeingexploredfor
MoonandMarsmissions.
Initialcostin termsof masslifted
intoorbitwillbehigh;but,sinceit
isexpectedto functionindefinitely
andsinceit willpayfor itself(that
is,generatefoodandoxygen
equalinmassto themassof the
system)in 5-7 years, the system is
expected to have minimal costs
over its lifetime. A benefit of a
bioregenerative system is its ability
to provide psychological comfort as
well as supply fresh food to crews
who are isolated from the Earth for
a long time. Research continues
on recycling, system stability, and
food production (Hubbard 1989).
NASA has awarded grants to
universities and research centers
to experiment with growing such
crops as wheat, lettuce, white
potatoes, sweet potatoes,
soybeans, sugar beets, and
peanuts under weightless
conditions and under different
types of artificial light ("NASA
Seeks" 1988).
Lunar Greenhouse
Such a bioregenerative life support
system might provide psychological
comfort, as well as fresh food, water,
and air, to crews isolated from the
Earth for a long time.
Courtesy of the artist: Robert McCafl
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Gravity: Only one man, Yuri
Romanenko, a Soviet cosmonaut,
has ever been in orbit for close to a
year: He took a 326-day mission in
1987. His condition upon return
was quite alarming. He had
significant loss of skeletal bone; he
lost 15 percent of muscle volume in
his legs--enough to require him to
relearn to walk--despite exercise;
and there are serious concerns
about his heart.
Although the human body responds
to microgravity with neurovestibular
changes that can cause astronauts
to suffer temporary disorientation
and sickness during a mission,
there are more serious
musculoskeletal and cardiovascular
effects such as loss of muscle
mass, bone decalcification, and
blood pooling that can cause
problems in flight and after the
astronauts return to gravity.
Exposure to space produces
biochemical and physiological
changes in plants and animals from
the cellular level to the whole
organism.
Bone Densitometer
This total body bSne densitometer
measures the total calcium in the human
body. Loss of calcium has been seen in
astronauts and cosmonauts who have
experienced weightlessness for more
than a few days. Such a loss has also
been observed in subjects in bed rest
studies (the conditions of which may more
nearly resemble the reduced gravity of the
Moon). The Medical Sciences Division at
the Johnson Space Center is studying
ways to reduce the calcium loss in space
by giving subjects exercises to perform or
medication or both,
C,,I_IN_,L_ , .,_,_
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Space Station Freedom will have a
life science research facility that will
include a centrifuge system (1.8-
2.5 meters in diameter) that
produces an environment with
gravity levels of 0.01-2.0 g. This
is a first step in a program that
requires acceleration devices in
order to analyze the effects of
microgravity and varying levels
and exposure times of linear
acceleration on biological systems
(Hubbard 1989).
There are now serious doubts that
humans can work effectively or
efficiently in weightlessness for
longer than 4 to5 moht-h-s.......
Humans cannot stay weightless in
space more than about 12 months
without risking permanent physical
damage (Banks 1989). Since
the shortest Mars trip will take
14-17 months, and the more
efficient trips will take 3 years,
advanced countermeasures are a
must. They will probably include
artificial gravity created by rotating
the entire vehicle or by using a
local centrifuge. Areas of further
study on artificial gravity include
temporary versus constant
exposure, radius and rates of
rotation, and the associated g
Ioadings, side effects, and
problems of transition between
nonrotating and rotating
environments (Aaron et al. 1989).
A goal of NASA's Ames Research
Center is to extend the presence of
humans in space. A growing body
of data reveals an interdependence
among the musculoskeletal,
cardiovascular, and endocrine
systems. There is an emerging
interdisciplinary approach at
Ames which recognizes the
interrelationship of physical forces,
gene expression, metabolic
processes, and hormonal activity.
Biomedical research, human
performance, and life support
systems form the core of the Ames
program. How the effect of
microgravity on human systems
can be modified by exercise,
artificial gravity, autogenic feedback
training, and nutrition is under
study (Hubbard 1989).
The space station's clinical health
maintenance facility includes basic
diagnostic and therapeutic
equipment both for use in near-
Earth orbit and for gauging the
more demanding medical
implications of exploration
missions (Aaron et al. 1989).
Shelter: Shielding systems must
be developed for flight as well as at
the destination points. Travelers to
Mars would face ionizing radiation,
mostly galactic cosmic rays in
interplanetary space, and might
experience severe proton flux from
occasional solar particle events.
Shielding must protect the crew in
flight, whereas burrowing or placing
bags of soil atop habitats will
probably protect explorers on the
martian or lunar surfaces (Aaron et
al. 1989).
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Sandbagging
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Loose regolith
Hosebagging
Tiered regolith Regolith membrane
Spray-on regolith Regolith shingle bag
Opt/ons for Habitat Radiation Shielding
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Dr.LowellW.Woodandhisgroup
at Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory suggest building
inflatable spacecraft for space
stations and a Mars probe instead
of the rigid metal variety now
planned. The use of inflatables
accounts for part of the cost
savings asserted by the LLNL
proposal. The drawback is that
these systems would be used
without testing in space and thus
the risks to the crew would be
much higher.
Producing in Space:
Commercialization
The U. S. Commerce Department
projects that space venture
Lunar Outpost
In this artist's concept of the lunar outpost
described in NASA's 90-Day Study, the
construction shack (foreground right) has
been used as the initial habitat while the
larger inflatable dome habitat was put into
place, inflated, outfitted, covered with
regolith for radiation shielding, and
provided with solar power. In the concept
proposed by Lowell Wood and his group at
Lawrence L_vermore National Laboratory,
by contrast, the inflatable comes with all
its contents already inside. It inflates
automatically, and all the interior structure
simply unfolds to provide rooms, plumbing,
electrical circuitry, and furniture.
Artist: John Michael Stovall
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The inflatable habitat
The construction shack
Connecting tunnel
Continuous, coiled regolith bags for
radiation protection
Regolith bagging machine, coiling bags
around the habitat while bulldozer
scrapes toose regolith into its path
Thermal radiator for shack
Solar panel for shack
Experimental six-legged walker
Solar power system for the outpost
Road to landing pad
Solar power system for the lunar
oxygen pilot plant
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revenueswill be about $3.3 billion
per year, with a real growth of
10 percent per year. Except
for communication satellites
and possibly launch vehicles,
commercial space development
is expected to be further down
the road. The Japanese project
a similar market size in the near
term; they believe that the market
for made-in-space semiconductors,
alloys, glass, ceramics, and
biomedicines will top $3.5 billion
per year. But they foresee
considerable growth by the year
2000, perhaps even hitting
$24 billion (Buell 1987).
It doesn't make sense to explore
space with manned missions
unless those missions hold an
ultimate possibility of becoming
wealth-creating. The space
industry, as an infant industry, is
extraordinarily high in risk and low
in short-term return. NASA has
taken important steps to nurture
commercial interest in the program.
This is essential to converting
technological insights into spinoff
products and processes, as well as
having the network in place to
support future development and
expansion.
Policy formulation: NASA
introduced its Commercial Space
Policy (CSP) in 1982 to reduce the
risks of doing business in space
and to establish new links with the
private sector in order to increase
development. Concerns addressed
by the policy included rising
insurance costs, safety, and
competition from the commercial
interest of other space programs,
such as ESA's Ariane (Lamontague
1986).
The Reagan Administration
designated commercialization a
basic element of the U.S. space
program. A major administrative
concern was to create mechanisms
for ensuring fairness for companies,
users, and consumers who will be
entering the space business in the
future. To foster a new private-
sector space industry, such policy
approaches as privatization,
marketing of privately owned
technology currently used
exclusively by the Government,
private development of new
technology with major assistance
from the Government, and private
development of new products
and services without major
governmental assistance were
introduced (Levine 1985).
Entrepreneurial seeding: U.S.
business had been confined to the
role of Government contractor from
NASA's inception until 1984, when
the Office of Commercial Programs
was formed. Since then, more than
half of the 50 largest U.S. industrial
corporations have been participating
in NASA-sponsored commercial
space activities. NASA has also
established an enormous
technology transfer network and
developed numerous joint
contractual arrangements that offer
flight time for applied industrial
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research and development (Switzer
and Rae 1989). This vital role
played by NASA in partnership with
the private sector has enabled the
U.S. program to keep ahead.
The NASA Center for Advanced
Space Propulsion at the University
of Tennessee Space Institute near
Tullahoma is one of 16 proposed
research centers to receive
$5 million per year from NASA for
5 years as startup capital, after
which the centers are to be
financially self-sufficient. Initially
focusing on studying access to
space, the U.T. consortium
includes
• Auburn University
• Princeton University
• University of Alabama,
Huntsville
• Air Force's Arnold Engineering
Development Center
• Boeing Aerospace Co.
• Calspan Corp.
• Rocketdyne
• Saturn Corp.
• Symbolics, Inc.
• Technion, Inc.
The objective of these planned
consortia is to boost the United
States into a competitive posture in
the commercial use of space in the
next century (Mordoff 1988). The
early years are expected to be
more research than manufacturing,
with new products and processes
needed for private ventures in
space expected to evolve from
these research efforts. To make
commercialization of space more
attractive, longer range projects
are also planned in areas that
businesses need, such as creating
vacuums and growing crystals
(Feder 1990).
The United States is not alone in
stimulating private participation:
The Europeans and the Japanese
are aggressively seeking
opportunities to develop and
provide products and processes
to the global space industry.
Intospace GMBH (Hanover, West
Germany), the most active and
important of European space
companies, is a consortium of
94 European industrial investors,
mainly German giants such as
Krupp, Hoechst, and Daimler-Benz.
This consortium has $3 billion
to spend on commercializing
microgravity research (Peterson
and Schares 1988). Intospace is
evaluating participation in the
Cosima flights' protein crystal
growth missions, as well as two
other research missions--
Suleika (space processing of
superconductive materials in
microgravity) and Casimer (catalyst
materials) (Mordoff 1988).
Nippon Electric Company,
Mitsubishi Electric, and Toshiba,
each a $15 billion plus company
and a vertically integrated maker
of microelectronics, computers,
telecommunications equipment,
and other high technology
products, previously relied on
70
government contracts and U.S.
technology to expand their satellite-
related business. Now they are
using their own capital and forming
partnerships to develop their own
products (Davis 1989).
Access: Although only in low Earth
orbit, a network of space stations
is emerging that wilt enable live
testing of experimental material and
technologies, hopefully enabling
definitive progress in the critical
technology areas blocking our
advancement in space. Space
Station Freedom, a $30 billion,
500-foot U.S. craft consisting of
nine pressurized modules and
requiring 31 shuttle flights to loft
modules, support structures, solar
panels, station equipment, and
supplies into orbit, will begin
assembly in 1995, with completion
expected in 1999. Five times the
length of the Soviet Mir station, it is
a spacecraft, a work station, and an
experimental prototype to research
products and processes. "It's the
first time anything of this magnitude
has been attempted by the human
race"--Dr. William F. Fisher,
astronaut (Broad 1990c). It will
house astronauts doing scientific
experiments (serving as a research
laboratory) and it is currently being
regarded as a way station for
voyages to the Moon and Mars
(serving as a transportation node).
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Space Stations
S_lab, launched May 14, 1973; occupied
three times during 1973 and 1974; fell
back into the atmosphere July 11, 1979
Mir, with a Soyuz spacecraft docked
below it
Photo: Novosti Press Agency
Salyut, with a Soyuz spacecraft docked on its left
Freedom
Artist: Vincent di Fate (NASA Art Program Collection)
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The near-zero-gravity environment
aboard the Space Shuttle and at
the space station was expected
to lure producers of chemicals,
semiconductors, pharmaceuticals,
metals, and many other products
to sign up or begin negotiating
research agreements ("The
$30 Billion Potential" 1984). Such
basic research interests have not
materialized to date. However,
as the space industry in general
begins to evolve, economic
rationale for such basic research
might still develop.
The United States has gotten
leverage from the Space Shuttle
and the space station to date on
intergovernmental levels. For
example, the Japanese space
agency, NASDA, and NASA are
sharing the cost of equipment
and have agreed to share data
obtained from an International
Microgravity Lab (IML-1) to be
flown on the Space Shuttle
Columbia in early 1991. The series
of cooperative experiments includes
developing a new conductive
material and investigating potential
use of microgravity in making
new alloys, semiconductors, and
pharmaceutical products not
manufactured on Earth (see
table 9 for other examples).
The Soviet Mir space station, a
100-foot-long flying laboratory, is
nearing completion of the first
phase of construction of a 20-ton
module (Broad 1990). Mir has a
readily accessible lab, available
on a rental basis to foreign
astronauts and scientists as an
orbiting factory, observatory,
and observation post from which
Earth's changing environment
can be studied. The Soviets have
demonstrated the ability of humans
to live and work in orbit for up to
7 months. The Soviets have more
in-space experience than any other
nation (see table 10); however,
their program has some serious
coordination problems. The
Soviets have underestimated the
complexity of the job. On-orbit
assembly has been harder than
expected. Half of their instruments
are not yet operational and have
not been fully tested (Broad
1990c). Crews lose time on
repairs and technical work, and
Mir is too small, as it is stuffed with
equipment. Nevertheless, of all
participants in the space industry,
the Soviets share our vision of
moving beyond low Earth orbit
and have the stature, in terms of
in-hand technology, to do so.
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TABLE 9. U.S. Leverage Derived From Infrastructure Development:
International Cooperative Efforts
Project/ Participants Scope Leverage for
launch U.S.A.
Int. Micro- NASA, U.S.A. Series of cooperative Share cost of
gravity Lab NASDA, Japan experiments to develop equipment,
(IML-1) new conductive material: share data
Early 1991 Investigate potential obtained
use of microgravity
in making new alloys,
semiconductors, &
pharmaceutical products
not manufactured on
Earth
Spacelab NASA, U.S.A. Use Spacelab Equipment
sharing ESA, Europe free of charge provided by others,
Australia Non-U.S, provide share data
Canada equipment for obtained
Israel experiments
(invited by NASA)
Japanese NASDA, Japan Largest joint U.S. technology
Satellite NASA, U.S.A. U.S./Japanese & facilities in
Geotail space program: exchange for
Launch at 80% Japan, 20% U.S.A. Japanese
Kennedy To measure the Sun's financing
Space energy flow in the & assembly
Center Earth's magnetic field
(1992)
Space NASA, U.S.A. Build orbiting Build larger
Station ESA, Europe S.S. Freedom facility than
Freedom Canadian possible
(1995) Space Agency independently,
NASDA, Japan share data
Sources: Moosa 1989, NASA 1988.
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TABLE10. Soviet Union Space Development Program:
Strengths and Weaknesses
Areas of strength: in-space experience
• The U.S.S.R. launches 90 to 100 spacecraft yearly, on a regular basis.
• 80% of the active satellites orbiting Earth belong to the U.S.S.R.
• Soviet cosmonauts have flown in space more than twice the hours of American
astronauts and hold the record for human endurance in space.
• Space Station Mir, while smaller than Space Station Freedom, is in orbit
already, and occupied. The U.S. space station will be functional in 8-10 years.
• The Soviets launched Energia, a new heavy lift vehicle, in May 1987, a
significant technological step. The Energia is capable of launching 100 tons
into Earth orbit--4 times the Space Shuttle payload and 5 times the U.S.
rocket payload.
• The U.S.S.R. launched 200 payloads into space between 1985 and 1987-
10 times the number of the U.S.A.
Areas of weakness: program coordination
• The 1990 mission with the Energia launcher has been cancelled, creating a
gap of more than 2 years between heavy lift vehicle flights. It has been
rescheduled for 1991.
• The aerospace industry is so decentralized that scientists and other space
mission planners are excluded from participation in critical spacecraft
development.
• The Soviet 1994 Mars lander-balloon mission is 5 years away from launch but
still has not been fully defined.
• Two Phobos Mars missions failed.
• Changes have to be made in the design, software, and quality control of the
dominant unmanned segment of the program to overcome the delays and
failures of the last 2 years.
• Shuttle development took expertise away from the rest of the program.
• The U.S.S.R. space program employs over one million scientists and
engineers, but there has been little substantial output. Risk taking is
discouraged; thus, there has been only gradual development of simple
systems and a lack of good instrumentation.
Sources: Anderson 1988; Budiansky 1987-88; Covault 1989a; DeAngelo and Borbely 1989; Lavoie
1985; "Soviet Technology," Aviation Week 3-20-89.
75
Access to space does not belong
exclusively to national governments
and their space agencies. Several
private companies have developed
space station concepts on their
own, including Space Industries,
Boeing, and Westinghouse, which
are designing a $500 million
Industrial Space Facility in Webster,
Texas, for completion in the early
1990s, and General Electric, which
is designing an unmanned, free-
flying minilab.
The Japanese have been rather
reticent to date regarding
participation in the space industry;
however, they initiated a $43 billion
space development program for
the period 1989-2006, which
is composed of a series of
commercial projects, including
satellite programs, a robotic
program, and a space factory for
drugs and semiconductors, and
infrastructural projects, including
the construction of four platforms,
an orbital maneuvering vehicle,
and an inter-orbit transport space
vehicle, as well as participation
in the U.S. space station and
construction of their own dedicated
Japanese space station (by 2008).
These projects are in addition to
the HOPE spaceplane development
project (see table 11). If all of
these activities are realized, the
Japanese will have a significant
base from which to develop
products and processes to meet
the needs of the space industry as
it grows, as well as to create new
product concepts for Planet Earth
consumers.
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TABLE 11. Japanese Space Commercialization Program,
$43 Billion, 1989-2006
Proposed project Est. cost,
billions of
dollars
Timetable
Development of spaceplane "HOPE"
(H-2 Orbiting Plane), 15.86
with H-2 rocket booster
Participation in U.S. Space Station
Freedom (space-processing module) 2.23
Polar-orbit platform 1.24
Station common orbiting platform 3.31
Orbital maneuvering vehicle 0.82
Inter-orbit transport space vehicle 6.21
Geosynchronous orbit platform 2.48
Manned platform 3.31
Dedicated Japanese station 7.31
Satellite programs ( + H-2 booster)
(incl. communications, broadcasting, 20.5
weather)
Robotic space research program 2.4
"ADEOS" (Advanced Earth Observation
Satellite) (precursor to participation
in int. Mission to Planet Earth)
Space factory for drugs
& semiconductors
1.2
No budget yet
1989-2006
1987-1995
1988-2006
1989-2010"
1991-1995
1992-2000
1995-2008"
1996-2001
2001-2008"
1989-2004
Early 2000s*
1994 +
Mid-2000s*
*Not included in the $43 billion commercial program.
Sources: Buell 1987; "Japanese Commission," Aviation Week 7-13-87.
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Destination-Driven Innovation:
The Evolution of Major Resource
Development Projects
•.. the empty fragility of even
the noblest theorizings as
compared with the definitive
plenitude of the smallest fact
grasped in its total, concrete
reality.
(de Chardin 1972, p. 62)
Colonizing the Moon or Mars
seems almost frivolous when
placed against the backdrop of
problems, concerns, crises near at
hand on Planet Earth. However,
there are realities taking shape
that may make such projects real
lifesavers: Our planet is simply
exploding with people; our
supplies of raw materials and
resources are being drained;
continued pollution of the
environment by manufacturing
plants and the burning of fossil
fuels is endangering the long-term
sustainability of our ecosystem.
And the relationships between
atmosphere and climate uncovered
in the examination of the
greenhouse effect on Planet
Earth, combined with further
examination of existing conditions
on Mars, might just reveal to us a
methodology for terraforming
Mars--delivering to us yet another
entire planet to inhabit.
We have a knowledge base
developed during the Apollo days
that can be readily applied to a
return mission to the Moon or to
new ventures outward in the solar
system to Mars. However, more
than 20 years have passed since
the landing of Apollo on the Moon,
markedly diminishing the pool of
experts with hands-on experience.
We are fast approaching a point
where it will become necessary to
reinvent the wheel.
More than the expertise to be lost
by not moving toward settlement of
a particular destination is the
expertise to be gained from the
synergy required to plan, develop,
and operate such a project. Solar
scientists and electrical engineers,
for example, tend to keep their own
company in planning, designing,
and prototyping solar energy
systems and equipment. However,
when the discussion changes to
establishing a colony on the Moon,
a whole range of very tangible
problems and issues become
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immediatelyrelevant:dealingwith
the long days and nights; providing
energy for residential, commercial,
and manufacturing support;
providing sufficient backup to
sustain life in the face of any and
all calamities. Many insights will
come from the interface of
prospective corporate users,
astronauts, scientists, and
engineers.
Finally, the timing of such a
magnificently difficult undertaking
is critical. The vital capabilities
must be in place before site
development planning begins.
It is simply not possible to begin
to design an industrial city that
includes technologies that are still
being developed. All systems,
processes, technologies used must
have achieved closure: they must
be fully developed, tested, and
proven. It is simply not feasible to
move workers out to construct a
work camp with an unproven power
source or oxygen supply. Thus,
destination-focused innovation is
subsequent to development of the
vital technological capabilities, but
the destination people can and
certainly should have input into the
capability development process.
Once exploration of potential sites
is completed, a destination is
selected, and colonization has been
decided on, the major resource
development project begins to
evolve (see table 12), following a
very clear and well-tested path
from concept development, through
negotiation and contract letting, to
construction and finally startup (see
table 13), each of which will be
examined in one of the following
sections.
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TABLE 12. U.S. Mission Scenarios: Destination-Driven Innovation
Destination Proposed Scope Est. Est.
project(s) budget schedule
Moon As observatory Sporadic missions to
(proposed) conduct scientific
experiments; or unmanned
astronomical observatory
As base colony Live off the land, free
(no Mars) of logistical support
from Earth
As milestone to Manned lunar outpost: $33 2019
Mars Multiple science billion on Mars
opera_ons /year
Develop experience
Staging area for Mars
• expedition
Mars Exploration Exploration, operations
(proposed) Technologies humans-in-space
R&D vehicle technology
research to get to Mars
at a reasonable cost
Mars Rover 10 unmanned precursor $40
Sample Return sampling missions to billion
(MRSR) photograph, return rock
& soil samples,
meteorological data,
water content, mineral
composition of soil
10 years
Mars via Moon (see Moon)
Mars direct Single expedition $36 2019
billion
/year
(peak)
Manned outpost/
no lunar base
Manned outpost prior
to lunar base
Phobos & Moons of Mars
Deimos
35 missions Extraordinary $18 1990-95
planned cosmological billion
discoveries expected
that could revolutionize
major areas of science,
especially physics
(unmanned)
Universe
(under way)
Sources: Broad 198g, fgg0a, b, d; Cook IgSg; Covault fg88, Ig8gb, c, d; De! Guidice Igsg; Lane tgsg;
"Mars, the Morning After," Christian Science Monitor 7-27-89
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TABLE 13. Life Cycle of a Major Resource Development Project
IEx0o,at l0evoo0me;/,I
& contract letting//
Construction_
& stadup /Z
Development of a particular
destination in space is not free
from the need to innovate and
advance. We have no experience
in establishing large communities
that are completely dependent on
their infrastructure for oxygen.
We have not yet developed
construction techniques for
connecting materials that will
endure in space and provide
sufficient protection against
radiation. Our entire body of
materials, construction techniques,
logistical concerns, and supply
networks must be experimented
with and established. Our notions
of project management must be
revised--perhaps even to include
"breakthrough" management--so
that, as the project unfolds,
innovative solutions can be sighted,
experimented with, and efficiently
integrated.
We are not completely in the dark
in this regard. All of the very
largest scale development projects
installed on Earth have had some
ground-breaking technology
component. In most cases the
technology already existed and just
needed to be adapted to the
expanded scale: Many, however,
introduced completely new
technology. We may have already
zeroed in on the two or three best
materials for use in space, but it is
another issue altogether to produce
enough and work with it in the
amounts required to establish an
industrial city.
Exploring Uncharted Courses
Before we can reach out to space,
master the abundance of its
resources, and make it truly ours,
we must understand what is there,
how it is laid out, and how the
various components interact. This
requires developing and operating
instruments to measure, define,
bring back samples, map,
photograph, and provide high-
resolution imaging.
Unmanned planetary probes have
proven to be efficient, exciting, and
scientifically rewarding. Voyager 2,
for example, was launched
12 years ago and is still functioning
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Figure 9
Voyager at Neptune
This Voyager 2 picture of Neptune,
taken in August 1989, is one of the best
full-disk views of that planet. Neptune,
30 000 miles in diameter, is the smallest
of the big gaseous outer planets. The
small white features are high clouds of
condensed methane, which cast shadows
on the top of the denser atmosphere
below. The two larger, dark features are
the Great Dark Spot and Small Dark Spot,
They are the upper expression of giant
storms in the atmosphere of Neptune and
appear to be similar to the Giant Red Spot
on Jupiter.
This view of Triton is a mosaic of a
number of close-up photographs taken
on August 25, 1989, during the closest
encounter of Voyager 2 with the satellite of
Neptune. Triton has a complex surface,
with a few craters, probably made by
comets. Triton probably has a silicate
core about 1250 miles in diameter covered
by a crust of water ice about 200 miles
thick, A thin layer of nitrogen ice may
overlay part or all of the water ice. Some
of the complex morphology is caused by
the fracturing of these icy mantles and the
outflowing of liquid water at some time in
the past. The temperature at the surface
of Triton was measured by Voyager 2
at 38 K, making it one of the coldest
surfaces in the solar system. Methane
frost is also likely present, and the reddish
color of some regions may be caused by
sunlight uv radiation reacting with the
frozen methane.
flawlessly. In fact, we are the only
spacefaring nation that has had
the confidence and ability to send
machines on long, intricate
journeys to the giant outer planets
(see fig. 9). This is an exclusive
strategic niche in which we have
faced little competition to date--
perhaps because the payback from
such activities is not immediately
apparent.
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A balanced approach is a basic
tenet of NASA's current space
science strategic plan, which
includes a mix of moderate
and major missions totaling
six launches a year in the early
1990s (Smith 1989). A major new
science mission is planned every
year through the turn of the
century. Over the next 5 years,
the United States has a firm
schedule to put up 35 scientific
flights, a rate 6 times as great as
during the past decade and equal
to that of the 1960s (Cook 1989).
The task of developing an
instrument with which to explore
the universe is getting to be a
highly collaborative effort. "Big
science"--a term coined by Alvin
Weinberg in the 1960s when he
was director of the Oak Ridge
National Laboratory in Tennessee--
involves the collaboration of teams
of researchers, technicians,
Government officials, university
administrators, and industrial
contractors and large sums of
money to produce new instruments
to advance our understanding of
nature (Lederman 1990) (see
table 14, which accompanied a
New York Times article on the
Hubble Space Telescope). The
Hubble Space Telescope, the most
expensive unmanned scientific
spacecraft ever built by the United
States and the most difficult to
operate, was developed by
60 scientists from 38 institutions
selected by NASA and involved
nearly every sector of the space
agency. A $1.5 billion effort,
with an operating budget of
$200 million/year, it is a product
of such U.S. organizations as the
Jet Propulsion Laboratory, which
developed the wide-field camera;
Lockheed Missiles and Space
Company, which built the
spacecraft; and Perkin-Elmer
Corporation, which devised the
electro-optical system. Critical
help was also provided by the
13-nation European Space Agency,
which provided 15 percent of the
funds and supplied some of
the equipment in return for an
equivalent amount of observing
time by its scientists (see table 15)
(Wilford 1990a, b).
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TABLE i4. The High Price of Future Scientific Progress
Federal science projects to be carried out In the tgg0's whose construction costs are St00 million or more:
Expected Coat
Cate|ory Project Completion Life To Build
3O t30
years billion
i:_[,l_,ig
SpIce StatIon I lggg
An orbiting outpOSl from which aslronauts are l0 cOnduct a
variety of scientific expsrlments and p0ssibly sol up a forward
base tar the manned exploration of the Moon and Mars
Human Genoma Project I 2005
The largest basic biology project ever undertaken, seeking to 1delineate the entlre human genetic code, cOnsisting of threebillion subunils of DNA that influence human development
Catslnl Saturn Probe
Unmanned oral1 to examine the giant planet's atmosphere.
rings and moons
Comet Rendezvoua and Asteroid Flyby
Unmanned craft IO rendezvous with comet Kopff for three
years Ofeludy
Mars Ol_l_r¥lr
U_manm_d craft to orbit planet tot observation of surface,
almosphere and gravitational fields
Earth Observation System
Orbiting salelriles Io obtain wide array of data on environ-
mental changes
Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite
SateUite to galher data On earth's ozone loss and other
chemical trends
Ocean Topograp_ty Experiment
Satellite Io map ocean circulation and its interaclion with
atmosphere
1996
legs
1992
i i
2000
Ig91
1992
bllllan
years mIllIon
12 $80O
years million
3 leO0
years million
15 $17
years _li_n
years million
3 IU0
years million
Advanced X-Ray Astrophysics Laboratory
Salable tO inveatigale b_ack holes, dark matter, age of
universe
Extreme Ultraviolet Explorer
Sale,its Io map sky in unusual region of electromagnetic
spectrum
Gravitational Wave Observatory
Two ground-based instrumettts to try to detecl gravily waves
8-Meter Optical TOlotCop_=
TWO ground.based inslruments for general study of
st_t'S and planets
SuPerconducting Supercolllder
54.mile instrument to study elementary particles and forces
Relativistic Heavy ion Colllder
2 5mile atom smasher to probe structure of atomic nucleus
Continuous Electron Beam Accelerator
1.miTe inslrument Toprobe same structure in different way
Advanced Photon Source
Light-generating ring tO probe mailer's slruclure
High Macnetlo Field Laboratory
Facility for study el magnelic phenomena and materials
Advanced LIk'ht Source
Small lighl.genefating ring to sludy alomic slruclure of mailer
TOTAL
1997 15 $1.E
years billion
1991 2.5
years million
1995 _ 20 $190
-- l years million
2000 30 $170
years million
t 1999 30 T/J
years billion
1997 20 P*400
years million
1994 20
years million
1997 30
years million
tg95 30 $1tO
years million
1993 20 $100
years million
BCLION
Taken from William J. Broad, lggOd, "*Heavy Costs of Major Projects Pose a Threat to Basic Science," New York
T/rues, May 27, sec. A, pp. 1, 20. The T_mes' sources: NASA, Department of Energy, National Science
Foundation. illustrations by Seth Feaster.
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TABLE 15. The Hubble Space Telescope
Vision:
Mission:
Scope:
Sponsors:
Operation:
Design/
development:
Equipment
development:
Development
budget:
Operational
budget:
Maintenance:
Planned
observations:
Revolutionize mankind's understanding of the universe
Determine
• How fast the universe is expanding
• How old the universe is
• What the fate of the universe is
Focus on visible and ultraviolet light from all classes
of heavenly bodies
Johns Hopkins University
Space Telescope Science Institute
NASA
Association of Universities for Research in Astronomy,
a consortium of 20 institutions
60 scientists from 38 institutions (selected by NASA)
• Wide-field camera-Jet Propulsion Laboratory
• Faint-object camera--European Space Agency
• Spacecraft--Lockheed Missiles and Space Co.
• Electro-optical system--Perkin-Elmer Corp.
• Glass plates-Coming Glass Works
$1.5 billion, with a final cost of $2.1 billion including $600 million
in ground support facilities to test and operate the telescope and
process data from it
$200 million/year
Serviced by Shuttle astronauts every 2 years; returned to Earth
every 5 years for a complete overhaul
1500 astronomers in 30 countries submitted a total of
600 proposals for observations, in five categories:
• Planets in the solar system and search for planetary systems
around other stars
• Stars and stellar systems
• Areas between stars
• Galaxies
• Quasars
Source: Wilford 1990b.
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Figure 10
Mars Rover Sample Return
Robotic collection and return to Earth of
martian geologic samples would greatly
increase our understanding of the history
of Mars and would help us make workable
plans for human exploration of Mars.
Analysis of the samples would help
estabfish how recently volcanoes have
been active, what might have happened to
an earlier, more Earth-like atmosphere,
and whether surface conditions were ever
hospitable to riving organisms. In addition
to high scientific value in its own right,
such knowledge would enable astronaut
crews to focus on the most important
locations and scientific issues during their
later exploration of the Mars surface.
Sample return in advance of human
explorers would require either autonomous
or remotely operated vehicles that could
collect and package samples of rocks,
soil, and atmosphere and launch them from
the Mars surface to Mars orbit and on to
Earth. A roving vehicle (foreground) is one
attractive option for collecting the desired
samples. Whether the rover moves on
wheels (as shown), tracks, or legs, it will
have to navigate around surface hazards
and deriver the samples to the stationary
launch vehicle (background). Current
planning suggests that each such
rover/launcher combination would be
capable of returning about 5 kilograms
(11 pounds) of samples to Earth.
Artist: John Frassanito
Projects such as the proposed
Exploration Technologies (formerly
Pathfinder) R&D to develop
exploration, operations, and piloted
space vehicle technology to get to
Mars at a reasonable cost and the
Mars Rover Sample Return
(MRSR), a set of 10 unmanned
precursor sampling missions to
photograph, return rock and soil
samples, and gather meteorological
data in order to determine the
water and mineral content of the
soil (fig. 10) are just some of the
exploratory support systems
essential to determining whether
a particular destination is worth
developing.
The two major destinations under
serious discussion are Mars (6 to
12 months away) and the Moon
(3 days away). Many questions
must be answered before a
development location is targeted
and detailed planning can begin.
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Men on the Moon-the First and
Last (So Far)
Both Apollo t # moonwalkers can be
seen in the photo above: Edwin "Buzz"
Aldrin is the subject of photographer
Neil Armstrong, who can be seen
reflected in Aldrin's visor. Apollo t7
photographer Gene Cernan was not so
lucky when he snapped the photo below;
his subject, geologist Harrison "Jack"
Schmitt, was concentrating on taking a
sample of "House Rock."
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The following is one of a series of 5-minute
radio programs. Entitled The Engines of
Our Ingenuity, the series is written by
mechanical engineer John H. Uenhard and
presented by the University of Houston's
College of Engineering.
Mining the Moon
For 20 years, I've wondered why we lost
interest in the Moon so quickly after we
first walked on it. Maybe it was because
we looked over the astronauts' shoulders
and saw only a great slag heap. Now
geologist Donald Bun= asks if it's only that
or more. Does the Moon hold riches, or is
it just a scabrous wasteland?
We know a lot about the Moon today. It's
rich in aluminum, calcium, iron, titanium,
and magnesium. There's also plenty of
oxygen on the Moon, but it's all bound up
in compounds that are hard to break down.
You can get at it, but it'll take a lot of
processing. Maybe we can pull some
hydrogen and helium-3 out of the rocks as
well.
What's absolutely missing on the Moon is
anything volatile. There's no water--no
loose gas or fiquid of any kind. The
vacuum on the Moon is more perfect than
any we've ever created on Earth.
So can we go after minerals on the Moon?
Before we do, let's think about mining and
smelting on Earth. We use huge amounts
of water--huge amounts of power. We
consume oxygen and we put out great
clouds of gas. But there is no water on the
Moon, nothing to burn, and no power until
we put it there.
Without water, the Moon hasn't been
shaped the way Earth has, with alluvial
strata and deposits. Many of its riches
are all mixed together in the surface
(continued)
For Mars, we need to know: Is
there any way to add significant
oxygen to the atmosphere and
make the planet livable? Was
there ever life there? Was there
running water? How can the
severe temperatures be withstood?
Are the moons of Mars similar to
our planet's Moon, or different?
For the Moon, we need to know:
Does water exist at the poles?
Can we manufacture it from lunar
resources? What kind of shelter
is required to protect against
radiation? Should we walk away
from development as it is just a
heap of stones, or would use of
such techniques as a glass
enclosure (Biosphere I1)allow the
re-creation of Earth's atmosphere?
As exploration passes from just a
cursory look to indepth analysis
of resources available and
assessment of feasibility and costs
to exploit, the risks and stakes
become higher and the need to
share risks become§ essential.
NASA's role here should be to
develop the approaches and
techniques for getting to the
resource bases and to develop the
instruments to measure ore quality.
Having done so, the agency should
attract resource development
companies or entrepreneurs to
assume therespohslbiiities of
more detailed risk assessment,
extraction, and development.
Developing the Project Concept
Assuming that a location has been
identified which provides sufficient
resources to reduce or eliminate
dependence on supplies from
Planet Earth and does not appear to
be life-threatening, the next step is
to scope out a project concept.
This is a critical event requiring
enormous thought, as the format
decided on can prepare the way
for effective cooperation and
resourcefulness, or it can establish
an arena of intensive competition
and friction.
Lunar or martian communities could
be company-owned towns (like
mining towns in Australia), country-
owned towns (similar to the early
settlements in the United States),
or possibly international towns,
the heart of which would be an
internationally consistent
infrastructure provided by a
consortium of participating national
space agencies to foster and
facilitate residency and participation
by entrepreneurs, transient workers,
and a full melting pot of Earthlings
of all races, nationalities, and
backgrounds.
The critical decisions pertain to
allocating ownership and project
management responsibility among
the industrial and infrastructure
components of the development
project under each scenario.
*Donald M. Burr, 1989, Mining the Moon,
American Scientist, Nov.-Dec., 1313.574-579.
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The company-owned spacetown:
A large resource development
company (such as an oil extraction
and hydrocarbon processing, a
metal mining and processing, or a
pulp and paper company on Earth)
usually decides to set up camp in a
remote location because there are
resources to be extracted and
processed and there is a clear
profit advantage to assuming the
risks associated with life in a
forbidding environment. If the
location is far from civilization, the
resource development company
takes responsibility not just. to
supply the tools, techniques,
processes, and people to perform
the profit-generating task but also
to provide the life support
components usually supplied by
governmental agencies in more
civilized areas--such as water,
food, electricity, transportation
vehicles and networks, education,
and health care.
From our experience with company
towns on Earth, it is clear that they
are homogeneous (even if the
project sponsors are joint-venture
partners--everyone is working in
the same place). Problems faced
by resource developers responsible
for establishing a company town
are monumental, encompassing
issues far beyond business
management and profit generation.
Besides the logistical problems
common to all such mega-scale
undertakings, there is the problem
of transplanting a complete
communal system. The isolation,
the feelings of hardship, and the
social conflicts of workers operating
under such stressful conditions add
dimensions to the management task
that are perhaps the most complex.
It appears that technologically we
are capable of bringing enormous
resources to bear on a problem.
Risks and exposure can be reduced
to tolerable levels via joint ventures
and multicompany consortia. We
have expertise in managing in
remote locations and marshaling
the very best talent for a particular
task. The real block to smooth
performance has proven to be
the human element. Planners
frequently overlook the
environmental, social, and political
issues involved in creating a
company town here on Earth--
an oversight which may, in fact,
account for the most costly budget
overruns and schedule delays.
It should be noted that the cost
of these large infrastructure
components raises the break-even
point of the project, thereby
requiring that the productive
output be raised. Infrastructure
development also increases project
complexity, as responsibilities that
usually belong to local governments
fall to the project sponsors. And
the more complex the project, the
more difficult and dangerous the
management and coordination task.
Mining the Moon (concluded)
layer of dust. We'll probably begin by
surface mining for oxygen to sustainour
outposts in space. Metals will be useful
byproducts.
Pollution would be a terrible problem if we
mined the Moon the way we do Earth. The
Moon's near-perfect vacuum is going to
be useful in all kJnds of processing. If we
dumped gases on the Moon, the way we
do on Earth, we'd ruin that perfection.
You see, most gas molecules move more
slowly than the lunar escape veloci_/.
Only the fastest ones get away. Now and
then, slower ones are sped up as they
collide with each other. Then they also
can escape. Over the years, the Moon
loses any gas released on its surface, but
not right away. So we have to invent
completely closed processes to take the
Moon's wealth. That way we'll protect one
of the Moon's greatest resources-its
perfect vacuum.
The Moon is a rich place, but we must put
our minds in a wholly different space to
claim its riches. The Moon will reclaim
our interest as we learn to see more than
a slag heap. The Moon has held our
imagination for millennia, but in a different
way each time our knowledge of it has
changed. Today, our vision of the Moon is
on the threshold of changing yet again--
as we learn to look at it with a process
engineer's eyes.
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Figure 11
South Terminal of the King Abdulaziz
International Airport in Saudl Arabia
Courtesy of the Information Office of the
Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia
The country-owned spacetown:
We could go to the Moon or Mars,
plant our flag, and plot out our
territory (though we cannot claim
the territory; see Goldman's paper
on international law) much as the
early settlers did in America in the
1600s. We would create a rapport
within the town but might recreate
the conflict and friction between
towns owned by different countries
which has occurred on Earth.
The governmental body, possibly
NASA, would have an important
role to play: There are certain
facilities which are funded, installed,
and managed by governmental
authorities in communities around
the world; these include power,
transportation systems, water
and waste treatment systems, and
medical, educational, athletic,
and other such facilities that
promote the general well-being
of the population. The scope of
space infrastructure will certainly
be larger than the King Abdulaziz
International Airport in Saudi Arabia
(fig. 11), the largest airport in the
world, which was built in the middle
of the desert at a cost of $4.5 billion
by 10 000 workers (at the peak of
construction). It is a self-contained
city that includes a desalination
plant to get drinking water out
of sea water, a hospital, and its
own telephone system. It was
constructed to provide adequate
shelter, eating facilities, and
restroom accommodations for
80 000 travelers expected during
the 36-hour period of the hajj, the
annual Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca.
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The advantage of governmental
development and management of
supporting infrastructure is that it
provides access to life-sustaining
facilities to small as well as large
enterprises and to individuals of all
economic levels, enabling them to
undertake entrepreneurial as well
as corporate economic activities.
Governmental involvement in these
sectors encourages the most
broad-based development scenario.
Since these projects do not
necessarily generate a profit, the
go/no-go decision is typically based
on cost/benefit analysis: How
many people will be serviced by a
particular infrastructure facility and
how much economic activity can be
stimulated in return for the costs
assumed? Government initiation is
not intended to create a welfare
state but rather to foster economic
activity, support diversified growth,
and above all create taxpayers who
will pay off the debt incurred in
establishing the infrastructure,
cover its operating costs, and
support infrastructure expansion.
NASA could seed the growth of the
initial community and then sell the
infrastructure to the community,
once a sufficient economic base
was created.
The international spacetown: The
opportunity exists to go beyond
community development as we
know it today and establish a
true international--or citizen of
Planet Earth--community. A
consortium of national space
agencies could jointly plan, design,
and install an infrastructure network
to support a broad diversity of
economic activity in space.
Technical, financial, and market
supply and demand benefits
could be derived from this global
cooperative effort. It is essential
that technological compatibility
and interchangeability be achieved
so that products and processes
will be transferable to and usable
by all. Standards for gravity,
oxygen, food quality, screw
sizes, shielding densities, and
maintenance requirements
need to be set. Space medical
standards and practices must
be established. The costs of
setting up life in such remote
locations will be enormous. It will
be wise to share fully the costs
of infrastructure development,
undertaken in cooperation. Again,
the goal is to create a community
of economically productive
taxpayers, who will begin to
reimburse the national space
agencies for their design and
development efforts (funds which
could then be used to move to a
subsequent planet and begin the
same seeding process).
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The ultimate objective of the
international spacetown, however, is
to create a thriving self-governing
metropolis that is democratic and
full of opportunity for individual
entrepreneurs as well as large,
established global corporations.
In an environment where there
probably will not be curtains at the
windows and paintings on the walls
for some time, it is important that
individual creativity and ingenuity
be highly respected and given
broad leeway to realize itself.
Spacelab I, an Example of
International Development
of Space Infrastructure
OP,fL-,t,J_,. p:,c=
BLACK AND WHITE PHOTOG,_ApM
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Negotiating Risk Aflocation
At the very largest, megaproject
scale of development, no single
organization has yet been able to
finance, provide the technology
for, or market the output of the
completed facilities alone. A
broad array of technologies, both
infrastructural and industrial, are
required in large volumes to attain
mega-scale project parameters.
In addition, abundant transfers of
proven technological processes
and secured market demand for
the output are required to attain
economic feasibility. The project
requirements define the extent and
nature of the inter-organizational
collaborations needed to bring the
project to fruition. See table 16.
TABLE 16. Project Requirements and Consortia Formation
Requirements and consortia contract types
Type of project Project requirement_ Capital sourcing Technology transfer Market access
High risk Custom-tailored
Resource
development
project
Turnkey
manufactUring
facility
Infrastructure
development
project
Technology .r
transfer/
Capital /
sourcing _
MA
• Equity
• Loan and repayment
in output
• Suppliers' credits
Low risk
• Suppliers' credits
tied to turnkey
contract
• Possibly some equity,
but not necessary
Low-high risk
(depending on type)
• Concessionary
financing
• Equity usually held
by governmental
ministries
• Construction
management
• Design/construct
• Consortium of
contractors
Off-the-shelf
• Turnkey contract
• Turnkey contractor's
consortfum
Generally custom-
tailored
• Construction
management
• Design/construct
• Consortium of
contractors
Critical to
economic viability
• Buyers' consortium
• Production sharing
• Long-term purchase
agreements
• Coproduction (or
barter or payment
in kind)
Not critical
Cost/benefit calculation
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Figure 12
A Turnkey Factory on the Moon
Development of lunar resources may turn
out to be a commercial enterprise. In this
artist's illustration, a fictitious company, the
Extraterrestrial Development Corporation
(EDC), has installed an oxygen plant on
the lunar surface and is operating it and
selling the oxygen produced to NASA and
possibly other customers. The fluidized
bed reactor in the background uses
ilmenite concentrated from lunar soil as
feedstock. Oxygen is extracted from this
ilmenite by hot hydrogen gas, making
water vapor. The water is electrolyzed,
the oxygen is captured and stored as a
cryogenic liquid, and the hydrogen is
recycled back into the reactor. The power
for the plant comes from the large solar
collectors on either side of the reactor.
Artist'. Mark Dowman
Commercial resource development
projects are undertaken because of
a clearly visible opportunity to
make a profit in the face of clearly
high risks. The extraction and
processing of fuels and minerals,
and in certain cases the harnessing
of power sources, come under
this heading. In the developing
world, these projects are usually
sponsored by publicly owned
corporations or state-owned
enterprises and depend on private
equity capital in addition to any
public loans or grants the project
might be eligible for. Overruns
and delays during project
implementation can as frequently
be attributed to the partners
selected (too many, in conflict,
different goals for the project) as to
logistical and other difficulties
intrinsic to the project itself.
Some commercial projects are
"turnkey" projects, in which a
factory can literally be transplanted
to the site. These might be
manufacturing facilities, hydroponic
food farms, and other types of
processing plants that are
self-contained--perhaps even a
factory to extract liquid oxygen
from regolith on the Moon (fig. 12).
Turnkey projects are lower risk and
are typically supported by export
financing from the home country of
the technology process owner, in
addition to equity capital provided
by the plant owners.
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The final class of projects is
infrastructure development projects,
which provide life-sustaining needs
to a community, enabling its
members to carry out productive,
wealth-generating activities. Such
a project is often owned and
operated by a governmental agency
and, once operational, supported
by taxes and user fees. The initial
installation of these infrastructural
facilities, such as water supply,
waste treatment, power supply,
public housing, sports and
recreational facilities, as well as
transportation and communication
networks and public administration
buildings, is typically financed by
loans provided by international
development agencies or capital
raised from the public in the form
of bonds. A core infrastructural
network can be established at the
start of human settlement on other
planets and expanded as the
human base it supports is extended.
In my experience of megaprojects
developed on Planet Earth, in
particular in remote locations in
developing countries (Murphy
1983), I have seen effective
multicompany efforts to stabilize the
project parameters through
consortia negotiation and inter-
organizational contracting.
What a consortium is: In general,
as the level of risk increases,
so does the likelihood that a
consortium of companies will
be formed to insulate any one
participant from potentially
devastating financial consequences,
should the project fail. I am
consciously substituting the term
"consortium', for the expression
"joint venture," because it
suggests a more pragmatic basis
for collaboration and for sharing
risks, negotiating responsibilities,
and determining the split of profits,
if the project succeeds. The
parties involved in a consortium
contract among themselves to
specify the responsibilities of
each. The common features of a
consortium are that
It is task-based. Participants
are selected on the basis of
which project requirements
(capital sourcing, technology
transfer, or market access)
they are capable of satisfying,
rather than on who they are or
how large their organization is.
It involves risk-sharing. All
members assume some
measure of risk. Each
member's reward is tied to
the level of risk assumed,
with the payback period being
clearly delimited.
There is some competitive
advantage. Typically, a
member is selected because
it can offer to the combination
of participants one or more
competitive advantages.
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Thedecisionto formaresource
consortiumappearsto bemore
relatedto thelevelof projectrisk
thanto thelevelof sophistication
of thecapabilitiesoftheplayers
involved,as these collaborative
arrangements can be found
throughout the developing world
in all industry sectors and have
involved most of the leading
organizations of the world.
How proiect needs are met: These
collaborative undertakings provide
an effective way to satisfy the
enormous capital sourcing,
technology transfer, and market
access requirements common to all
megaprojects by ensuring that the
critical drivers of economic viability
are satisfied. However, the
contributions of such consortia to
enhanced effectiveness may vary
by industry sector:
For metal mining projects,
consortia make it possible to
increase the scale of a project
beyond the financial abilities
of a single company in order
to cover infrastructure
development costs
(sometimes up to 60 percent
of total investment) and meet
economic criteria. These
requirements have been more
intense of late, as most of the
Earth's remaining metal
reserves are in relatively
inaccessible locations.
For metal and petrochemical
processing projects, consortia
enable companies to
eliminate the threat of price
fluctuations on the output
by establishing long-term
purchase agreements with
buyers, while at the same
time hedging their risks over
several projects by taking a
low equity share in each.
For liquefied natural gas
(LNG) projects, consortia are
formed to establish a long-
term purchase agreement
with a guaranteed buyer who
must also build a tailormade
receiving terminal to unload
the output. Unless this
crucial requirement is met,
the construction of the
production facility--typically
ranging from 500 million to
several billion dollars--cannot
be justified.
Oil refineries, by comparison,
seem to have little problem
in finding buyers for their
products; thus, the need to
form a consortium to build
one has been less common.
Not only does the resource
consortium provide an important
vehicle for controlling some of the
external risks of a project which are
beyond the sponsor's ability to
manage alone, but also, depending
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on theexpertiseof thepartners,
theconsortium aybringtogether
sponsorswhosetechnologyand
managerialssistancecan
enhancecontrolof theinternal
riskfactorsof themegaproject
at thesametime. Ontheother
hand,if managerialexpertiseis
lacking,contractsfor projector
constructionmanagementcanbe
establishedwithorganizations
skilledintheweakareas.
How participant risks are minimized:
Capital funding and market access
are often secured for the project
through multi-organization
consortia, involving a share of the
project equity while minimizing
risk exposure for the respective
participants:
A multinational resource
development consortium
is typically composed of
shareholder corporations
from many countries,
each holding a very low
percentage of equity,
combined with long-term
purchase agreements for
access to the raw materials
output by the project. By
taking a low equity interest in
the project, each corporation
is able to syndicate its
investment risks over a large
number of projects and
thereby stabilize its raw
material supplies.
• A national resource
development consortium is
composed entirely of
companies from the same
country; it is composed of all
companies in a particular
industry at a very low equity
share per company, with a
substantial portion of the
capital loaned to the project
by agencies of their
government. The net effect
of such a consortium is to
equalize the risks and
stabilize supply sources, as
well as the cost of those raw
materials, across an entire
industry within a country.
Thus, a country like Japan,
which depends on imports
for 90 percent of its raw
materials, can marshal
industry-wide support for any
raw material acquisition the
national government would
like to make. Furthermore,
it shifts competition between
companies from obtaining the
best price for raw materials to
such downstream advantages
as more efficient processing
or manufacturing facilities
and more focused marketing
or distribution networks.
It is becoming easier to put
together consortia, as the key
players have built up an
experience base with respect to
inter-organizational collaboration.
As industries have evolved over
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thelast two decades, the ground
rules for collaboration among
international developers have
changed from nationalistic to
global strategic perspectives and
dimensions. Joint technology
and marketing ventures among
companies that have traditionally
been competitors have become
common.
Managing Project Construction and
Startup
As complex as construction and
startup are in the most remote of
locations on Earth, they will be
orders of magnitude more complex
on another planet. If handtools or
screws are forgotten, it will be a
long way back to get them;
replacement parts will not be
an airplane ride away; and Federal
Express or UPS will probably not
have offices in the closest city.
Several decisions can affect how
roughly or smoothly the construction
and startup will go.
Integrated or phased: Megaprojects,
whether resource or infrastructure
development, are brought to fruition
under management scenarios
that best meet the needs of the
participants, the capital constraints,
the level of technology in hand,
and the demand for the output.
Projects can be developed in an
integrated manner, installing all
components at the same time. An
example is the $20 billion AI Jubail
Industrial Complex in Saudi Arabia
(fig. 13). Expected to take 20 years
Figure 13
Seaport of AI Jubail Industrial Complex
in Saudi Arabia
Courtesy of the Information Office of the
Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia
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to develop,withacompletiondate
setfor 1997,it includesthree
petrochemicalplants,anoil
refinery,steelandaluminumplants,
waterandwastetreatmentfacilities,
adesalinationplant,housing,a
trainingcenter, a seaport, and an
international airport--all of which
were planned and developed under
one, integrated project concept.
Projects can also be developed in a
phased manner. One facility can
be installed which then provides
the base from which additional
facilities can be built. An example
is the development of the Bintula
area in Malaysia. First a $5 billion
liquid natural gas facility was
installed, supported by a basic
work camp and infrastructure.
A subsequent project is being
planned to develop the entire area
as a resort, including a new city, at
a cost of $10-15 billion.
Each approach has benefits and
risks, which are summarized in
table 17. An integrated approach
puts stress on the internal aspects
of the project, making procurement,
logistics, and labor management
more complex. However, there are
external advantages to coming
onstream earlier, such as a shorter
period for borrowing capital and a
quicker payback.
Phased development stretches out
the completion date of the fully
integrated project, thus allowing
competitive inroads, but permits
greater control over each section.
Procurement is phased, there are
fewer players involved at one time,
and adjustments are smoother.
TABLE 17. Economics and Project Sequencing
Approach Risks Benefits
Integrated development Overload (internal)
• More complex
• More procurement,
logistics problems
• Labor management
• Cultural conflicts
Online sooner (external)
• Shorter demand for capital
• Quicker return
Phased development Competitive threats/
inroads (external)
• Competitive moves
• Inflation in cost
• Other variances in
demand estimates
Able to test out one step before
moving on to another (internal)
• Simpler
• Phased procurement
• Fewer players at one time
• Smoother adjustments and
interface
99
For NASA, the issue is whether it
is better to develop a work camp
on the Moon only, or on the Moon
and on Mars, or on the Moon
first and then on Mars. Should
a small outpost be developed,
or an entire community? What
functions will the base serve? Is it
an observation post from which to
conduct science, or is it a resource
development base for mineral
extraction, or is it an infrastructure
base from which to explore and
experiment in search of wealth-
generating activities? The ability
to answer these questions will be
determined by the findings from
various exploratory missions. The
ability to respond to those findings
will depend on the extent of
technological breakthrough
achieved in our capabilities.
Achieving synergy: The most
important opportunity for
capitalizing on cost-reduction
opportunities, not to mention
actively preventing overruns, lies
in maximizing efficiencies during
the construction phase; that is,
the period during which most of
the capital is spent. The ability to
recognize and take immediate
advantage of the tradeoffs
that must be made daily can
provide significant cost savings.
Megaprojects often entail several
kinds of construction by multiple
contractors simultaneously;
therefore managerial synergy is
critical: (1) from one stage to
another, (2) among processes
installed, and (3) between the goals
of the sponsors and the services of
the technology providers. Attention
must be paid as much to the
transition points of a megaproject
as to performance within each
component. Unbudgeted costs
have often been incurred at these
critical transition points, where
leadership responsibility has not
been clearly defined.
Unique megaproject management
expertise: Companies which have
been successful providers of
project management expertise in
the developing world have relied
on their strong reputations and
expertise from their home countries
as their entree into the megaproject
arena. Since companies are not
awarded contracts to experiment
with or diversify their services but
rather to deliver proven expertise,
U.S. firms have been the companies
of choice because of their track
record of fully implemented mega-
scale projects that have been
developed at home. All projects of
$1 billion or more in the developing
world requiring project management
capabilities (such as oil refineries,
gas processing facilities, and
transportation infrastructure) have
been awarded exclusively to U.S.
design/construction firms.
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Themostcomplexmegaprojects
havebeendesigned,engineered,
constructed,andmanagedbythe
U.S.design/constructorsBechtel,
Fluor,andRalphM.Parsons.
Thesethreecompaniesare
superiorin theirabilityto dealwith
complexitythroughsophisticated
projectmanagementsystemsand
worldwideprocurementetworks.
ThissuggeststhatNASA's
continuedattentionto megaproject
managementinnovationwillensure
thatthisU.S.traditionof beingthe
preeminentprovidersof complex
projectmanagementservices
worldwide--acriticalnational
competitiveadvantage--willbe
sustained.
Theconsortiumisalsoa common
approachusedbysmallor
medium-sizeddesign,engineering,
construction,or manufacturing
companiesto achievethescale
requiredto bidononeof these
jobs. Consortiandindependent
turnkeycontractsaregenerally
writtenonafixed-feebasis,with
thecontractorabsorbingmostof
therisksassociatedwithdelaysor
overruns.Therearenumerous
variablesthatgointodetermining
theoptimumcontractualformula.
Ingeneral,thepurposeof these
packagesis to takeriskawayfrom
thesponsors,whileatthesame
timeremovingday-to-day
managerialcontrolof construction
fromthesponsor.
Options for a project sponsor:
The project sponsor's objective
is to establish an organizational
framework that lets each participant
know what to expect from the
others; how to handle changes
in cost, schedule, or tradeoff
opportunities; how to reach
decisions; how to keep the project
moving. An effective network of
project intelligence and a spirit of
"mega-cooperation" must be
achieved. Decision-making must
be done swiftly and surely, giving
prime consideration to the status of
the project rather than to the status
of the person who sits across the
table.
A review of existing megaprojects
indicates that there are three
generic ways in which owners or
sponsors structure their projects.
A sponsor's level of involvement is
a function of that firm's in-house
project management competence.
A sponsor can
Actively manage. Manage the
project directly--either as an
independent owner or as a
partner in a joint venture.
Direct and control. Contract
out the project preparation
to consulting engineers
and the construction work
to contractors or both,
maintaining responsibility
for day-to-day coordination
and management.
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Review and approve.
Contract out the complete
job to a project manager, a
turnkey contractor, or a
contractors' consortium.
Project management
contracts are usually cost
plus, while turnkey projects
(which delegate managerial
or supervisory control to the
contractor) are fixed fee,
thereby transferring risk to
the contractor. In this case,
a large contingency fee is
commonly added to the price
to cover potential risks.
As NASA gets closer to launching
the most complex megaprojects
of all time, it is important to
recognize that sufficient capital,
technology, and market access
can be pooled from a global
network of corporations and
financial institutions without
compromising NASA's role as
the energizing leader with the
ennobling vision.
102
Section 3: Sourcing--
and Sustaining--
Optimum Financing
Thanks to our discoveries
and our methods of research,
something of enormous
import has been born in the
universe, something, I am
convinced, will never be
stopped. But while we
exhaust research and profit
from it, with.., what paltry
means, what disorderly
methods, do we still today
pursue our research.
(de Chardin 1972, p. 137)
In words President George Bush
quoted from a news magazine,
the Apollo Program was "the best
return on investment since
Leonardo da Vinci bought himself
a sketchpad" (Chandler 1989).
Admiral Richard Truly, NASA
Administrator, concurs. He
believes that no space program
on Earth today has the kind of
technology and capability that
ours does. Our space program
is an integral part of American
education, our competitiveness,
and the growth of U.S. technology.
Compared with other forms of
investment, the return is
outstanding: A payback of $7 or
8 for every $1 invested over a
period of a decade or so has been
calculated for the Apollo Program,
which at its peak accounted for a
mere 4 percent of the Federal
budget. It has been further
estimated that, because of the
potential for technology transfer
and spinoff industries, every $1
spent on basic research in space
today will generate $40 worth of
economic growth on Earth.
Spinoffs
Spinoffs from NASA's development of
space technology not only provide
products and services to the society but
also are a significant boon to the American
economy, Among the hundreds of
examples are this sensor for measuring
the power of a karate kick and this
thermoelectric assembly for a compact
refrigerator that can deliver precise
temperatures with very low power input.
Estimates of the return on investment in the
space program range from $7 for every
$I spent on the Apollo Program to $40 for
every $1 spent on space development
today.
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The critical factor driving
productivity growth is technology.
The percentage of our national
income that we invest in research
and development is similar to the
percentages invested by Europe
and Japan; however, since our
economy is so much bigger, the
absolute level of our research and
development effort, measured in
purchasing power or scientific
personnel, is far greater than
Europe's or Japan's (Passell
1990). But our ability to sustain an
appropriate level of investment in
R&D is being threatened. We are
overwhelmed by our national debt,
our decaying infrastructure, and
the savings and loan bailout, which
alone is expected to cost the
Government $300-500 billion,
possibly more. To pay these
debts would cost each and every
American taxpayer between $1000
and $5000, and this is a payment
that will not enhance national
security, promote economic
growth, or improve public welfare
(Rosenbaum 1990). This obligation
is orders of magnitude greater than
the commitments U.S. citizens
have made to their space program.
TABLE 18. Expenditures per Year by U.S. Citizens,
Selected Examples
Expenditure item Amount per capita
Space station funding, 1990 budget
Entire space program, 1990 budget
Apollo Program at peak
Beer
Legal gambling
$23.68
$55(approx.)
$70.00 (t988 dollars)
$109.00
$800.00
Source: Sawyer 1989.
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We have a military budget of
$300 billion (compared to
$200 billion per year spent on
legal gambling), yet we are too
broke to do anything (Baker 1990).
Further, our return on investment
in research and development is not
as effective as it once was. It is
possible that military spending is
draining critical research efforts;
it may be that the American
emphasis on basic research has
freed Japanese scientists to skip
the gritty groundwork and focus on
commercial applications; or is it
that American corporations may not
be good at turning research and
development into marketable
products? (Passell 1990).
Half of all Federal tax dollars go
to the Pentagon. These large
expenditures have hurt the
competitive position of the United
States and have kept the level of
investment in the civilian economy,
as a share of gross national
product, lower than in Europe or
Japan. For example, in 1983, for
every $100 we spent on civilian
capital formation, including new
factories, machines, and tools, we
spent another $40 on the military.
In West Germany, for every $100
spent on civilian investment, the
military received only an additional
$13. And in Japan, for every $100
spent on civilian investment, a
mere $3 was spent on the military.
Military spending is 6 percent of
GNP, but it pays for the services
of 25 to 30 percent of all of our
nation's engineers and scientists
and accounts for 70 percent of all
Federal research and development
money, $41 billion in 1988
(Melman 1989).
A "peace dividend" is in prospect,
if Congress will cut military
spending. A peace dividend offers
an opportunity for a political leader
to capture attention and resources
and do great good. The total
dividend through the year 2000
could be as much as $351.4 billion
(Zelnick 1990). How the peace
dividend should be spent calls
into play one's values. Many
alternatives are mentioned (the
savings and loan bailout, for
instance), but NASA is never
mentioned as an option.
Under this scenario of declining
technological edge, constrained
financial resources, and a
budgeting process that subjects
approved financing to annual
revisions and potential cuts, how
can NASA adequately source--and
sustain--optimum financing?
• Potential sources of funds
• Opportunities for sustainable
collaboration
• Life cycle of NASA's funding
responsibility
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Potential Sources of Funds
The traditional source of financing
for any nation's space program is
government financing of the
national space agency. But
government financing alone has
proven to be inconsistent and
unreliable in the long term, as
the space program is forced to
compete with other national
priorities. Furthermore, as the
scale and scope of space projects
increase, it becomes beyond the
capabilities of a single national
government to assume the risks
alone--it is effectively wagering
national wealth on projects of
varying levels of risk.
The stakeholders in the various
space development activities can
and increasingly should be called
upon to participate in the financial
risks and enormous potential
rewards of innovation that is driven
by the "consumers" of Planet
Earth, our need for advanced
technological capabilities, and
our desire to develop livable
destinations in space. These
stakeholders include
The national space agencies
of leading industrialized
(and some other) countries
around the world typically
have a space exploration
and development budget
representing about
1-6 percent of their GNP.
Maior corporations and minor
entrepreneurial companies
have a new product or
process development
budget or an exploration
budget that is allocated for
high-risk, wealth-creating
innovative activities.
Private investors, whether
individuals or pension funds,
have a portion of their savings
portfolio dedicated to high-
risk, potentially high-return
investments in stocks--and
even some bonds (i.e., junk).
The users of catastrophic
pollution-causing products or
processes are recklessly
risking the health of our planet
in our lifetime--and we are
not sure that the damage is
reversible. Such reckless
users could be assessed a
pollution surcharge to fund
breakthrough research on
nonpolluting new product and
processing technologies.
National/state city
infrastructure agencies and
international development
agencies receive funding to
provide particular life support
basics, such as water, power,
waste disposal, and schools,
to their communities or
developing nations. A
well-honed, functional
infrastructure maximizes
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productivity,enablingthe
creationof wealthby its
residents.Elimination
of overlapof effortand
globalcoordinationcould
freeupmassiveamountsof
investmentmoneyto achieve
moreeffectiveresults.
If these capital reserves were
added up per stakeholder
category, sources of funds for
Planet Earth problem-solving and
space development could readily
be uncovered in abundance.
Opportunities for
Sustainable Collaboration
Examining how these capital
resources are allocated, we can
readily see that there are billions
of dollars being invested in
research, design, development,
and improvement efforts which
overlap and duplicate each other
among organizations in the United
States, as well as around the
world. Many efforts fail to achieve
any significant technological
advancement precisely because
funds are not adequate or scope
of authority is not sufficient to
make any significant change.
For example, if it were decided
that automobiles were too heavy,
causing the serious deterioration
of our nation's infrastructure, and
that our automobiles and roadways
should be redesigned to achieve a
major technological advancement,
such an agenda could not be
decided on by General Motors
alone or the U.S. Department of
Transportation alone. Technological
advancements of such scale, and
more importantly of such global
significance, need to be mounted
under leadership so engaging and
with a vision so encompassing
as to ensure that all the key
players involved make their capital
resources, technological expertise,
and access to market demand
available to the project.
To take the discussion of our
transportation networks one step
further, the facts make it clear
that the need for technological
innovation is not hypothetical
but quite real:
Our national transportation
infrastructure has gravely
deteriorated, requiring
$3-5 trillion to reconstruct.
Our auto industry has lost its
competitiveness--at home and
abroad, and we are struggling
to regain a reputation for
quality that remains elusive.
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Theoutlookfortransportation
vehicle§'beingableto move
aboutourcitiesandsuburbs
atthelocalspeedlimitis
dimming,asroadsare
becomingincreasingly
cloggedandoverburdened.
Suchapproachesas
computerizedtrafficcontrol
screens within vehicles are
being tested.
The carbon monoxide
released from combustion
engines in autos and their
petroleum-based fuels is
presenting a grave hazard to
the global ecosphere.
And numerous projects are
on the drawing boards around
the world to break through our
current oropulsion barriers,
preparing the way to travel
at higher rates of speed.
The key players responsible for
shepherding such events include
the national, state, and city
transportation agencies, auto
manufacturers, oil production and
retail companies, propulsion-
focused R&D groups, and
automobile buyers and drivers.
Their diversity of interest and
scope of responsibility and the lack
of a single shared vision bodes
poorly for formulating an imperative
solution to this global time bomb.
An inter-organizational consortium
can be formed to address such
a problem, whether pertaining
to elimination of pollution or
development of technology,
infrastructure, or resources.
Shared risk and responsibility can
be established through negotiation
and cross-contracting to define
the vision, pool capital, share
technology, and create market
demand of sufficient magnitude
to bring such megaprojects to
fruition.
Since all prospective players are
currently citizens of Planet Earth,
the scope of their consortium
collaboration can be international
as well as national. The scope
is determined by the scale of
explanatory causes to be uncovered
or effects to be achieved through
project development. Consortia can
be assembled to achieve five
possible purposes:
Planet Earth protection
consortium: A global R&D
fund could be established,
supported by taxes assessed
on users of pollution-causing
products or processes. The
funds could be used to
identify causes of pollution
(thereby further increasing
the funding base) or to seed
technology innovation that
would provide the same
effect while preserving
the environment (i.e.,
government-sponsored
technological leaps).
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Technology development
consortium: A mix of
designers, manufacturers,
and prospective users of a
technology should be
assembled early on to get
the design criteria correct.
Seed money could be a
mixture of government and
private capital. The intent
of this consortium would be
to involve the companies
which would be most likely to
develop the spinoff products
early, so that their design
requirements and insights are
fully considered and taken into
account. A spinoff surcharge
or tax could be assessed as a
means of funding the seeding
of subsequent generations of
research and development.
Space exploration consortium:
Exploration is extremely costly
and high risk. In the oil
business, those who explore
and find oil then achieve
lucrative payback from either
extracting and selling the oil
themselves or selling rights to
the field. Exploratory
missions to neighboring
planets could involve a
consortium of resource
development companies
who would be interested in
undertaking some of the
enormously high risks in
exchange for enormously
high potential paybacks.
Infrastructure development
consortium: It is important
that the water, food, power,
waste, oxygen, and
gravitational systems be
compatible in space--to allow
for maximum interchange and
cooperation among players
from diverse nations who
might be colonizing space.
Agreement on standards is
critical to interchangeability
of goods and services among
participants from different
nations. Once standards are
set, a vast array of players
can begin to develop and
market their products and
services.
Resource development
consortium: Consortia of
resource extraction,
processing, and manufacturing
companies; contractors;
builders; equipment suppliers;
insurers; and so forth would
need to be marshaled to
achieve the scale and scope
of people and resources
required to implement the
establishment of a resource-
based colony in space.
Agreements to fund the costs
of installation with loans
to be paid back by users or
residents of the facility would
off-load the burden from the
national space agencies to the
global business community.
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Life Cycle of NASA's
Funding Responsibility
The financing required to realize
the full array of missions currently
on NASA's plate is truly
monumental. The exploration
projects alone are expected to
require more than $60 billion, with
more than $100 billion required to
operate the various exploratory
instruments in space (see table 14)
(Broad 1990d).
If NASA's leadership role is to be
the exclusive herald of the vision,
if its financing role is limited to
research and development, and if
its charter is clearly defined as
syndicating involvement in space
exploration and development
activities with the private sector, a
more realizable long-term agenda
emerges (see fig. 14):
Phase I (1990-2000): Seed
multi-pronged mission
initiatives. This phase requires
the greatest amount of
independent funding from
NASA, but it plants the seeds
for user fees and spinoff fees
to begin to return in phase II.
During the next 10 years
Planet Earth monitoring
will be initiated; our basic
exploration projects will be
under way, including the
Hubble Space Telescope;
more sampling missions will
be targeted for the Moon and
Mars; heavy funding of the
national aerospace plane
and controlled ecological
life support systems will be
provided; and syndication of
ownership to enlarge the
sphere of producers in space
will be promoted.
Phase II (2000-2010):
Develop an infrastructure
support system and do
intensive planning. While
some of the initiatives
launched in phase I will
continue (e.g., Mars sampling
missions, capability-driven
research), closure on the
techniques to be used to
support life in space should
be achieved. Closure will
enable manufacturing
companies to begin to
produce and market products
needed to support humans
in space. If these companies
were effectively integrated
into the early R&D, NASA
should begin to collect royalty
fees from spinoffs to finance
subsequent seed technologies
requiring Government-funded
nurturing.
Once the infrastructure
technologies and exploration
investigations reach closure,
mega-planning can begin for
colonization of the Moon and
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Mars. It will take years to
develop detailed designs;
negotiate the sharing of risk,
responsibility, and rewards;
and let contracts. This
process may require oversight
by NASA, but fees can be
charged for bid packages
and other services to allay
some of the costs.
Phase III (2010-2020):
Establish colonies on other
planets. This phase should
be largely funded by
participants, with funds
flowing back to the owners
and providers of the
infrastructure--if it is not
an integral part of the project.
As colonization begins,
products and services--on
Earth and in space--should
be completely revolutionized,
leading to a planetary
wealth beyond our wildest
imagination: There will be
an abundance of resources
available from space, new
products developed to
exploit space, and an
abundance of demands that
can be met here on Earth as
a result of the expanded
resource base.
Figure 14
Life Cycle of NASA's Funding
Responsibility
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We stand at the base of a learning
curve that extends to the end of
time. The expertise we hold in
hand is equivalent to our very first
steps, and the targets of our
shuffling are most undaring--our
closest neighboring planets.
Our notions of "high tech" living
are being edited daily, as our
planetary civilization rushes toward
its rendezvous with destiny.
There is new expertise to be
honed, new products to be
invented, new processes to be
engineered. The reality of
geotechnology, "which spreads
out the close-woven network of its
independent enterprises over the
totality of the earth" (de Chardin
1972, p. 119), suggests that there
is not much point to going it alone--
technology is meant to spread like
wildfire.
The specific mission objectives
sketched out in this paper may
not endure; the objectives may
change, or from the resulting
innovations may come small steps
that lead to a higher insight.
Advances in our ability to move
swiftly and surely up the learning
curve are as critical to our future
success as our specific
achievements. How business
systems can be redefined to
protect the planet, how
technologies can be pushed to
their highest performance levels,
how new technologies can be
created, how sites can be
developed in a more humane
fashion, how a massive multi-
organizational endeavor can be
coordinated as if it were a single
body, these are the methodologies
we are in search of perfecting,
equal in importance to the truths
we are striving to uncover.
Less than microscopic creatures
from the vantage point of the
Moon, totally dependent on our
1-pound brains and less-than-
1-pound hearts to navigate us
toward the unknown and decipher
its messages, we human Earthlings
have no more powerful resource at
hand than our ability to visualize,
commit, lead, and actualize--truly
incredible abilities that effectively
create our future. Our willingness
to center ourselves in a common
vision--a shared notion of
greatness--will abundantly energize
us toward fulfillment of even our
most elusive goals.
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